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TIMING OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE LEGISLATURES: AN 
EXAMINATION OF THE MOTIVES AND STRATEGIES OF CONTRIBUTORS 
 
 
There is a great deal of work on campaign finance at the national level, however, 
state level research is sparse. My dissertation fills this void in the literature by examining 
the motivations of contributors to state legislators. The literature discusses two major 
motivations of contributors – universalistic contributors, who hope to influence election 
outcomes, and particularistic contributors who hope to influence legislative votes. The 
primary hypothesis is that proximity to the general election is the primary factor in 
explaining contribution patterns in state legislatures; however, proximity to a legislative 
vote of interest to the contributor will also be significant in explaining contribution 
patterns. Additionally, the dissertation examines the impact of session limits on 
contribution patterns.  
I use campaign contribution data collected by the National Institute on Money in 
State Politics and select twenty-five bills in nine states to test the primary hypothesis. I 
use a contributor fixed effects model to test for increased or decreased levels of 
contributions for each contributor, given the proximity to the election and legislative 
votes important to the contributor.  
The results indicate that contributions increase across all states in the two months 
prior to the general and primary elections, and that proximity to the election is the most 
important factor in explaining campaign contributions in state legislatures. In 32% of all 
cases in the study, there was direct evidence of interest groups attempting to influence the 
outcome of legislative votes. Additionally, an increase in contributions close to a major 
legislative vote occurred in 77% of the cases without session limits, indicating that 
interest groups are highly active in attempting to influence policy outcomes. An 
additional examination of contribution patterns indicates that PACs shift their 
contributions to the beginning of the legislative session when faced with session limits. 
My research contributes to our understanding of the motives of campaign contributors 
and their actions when faced with legal restrictions on their contributions. This research, 
therefore, allows campaign finance reformers to make better reform decisions.  
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1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Campaign finance is a topic of contemporary importance to the American political 
system. Many citizens feel they have no voice in a political system controlled by special 
interests with deep pockets.  In a CBS/New York Times opinion poll conducted in January 
of 2006 63% of respondents stated you could only trust government some of the time. 
Furthermore, in a Washington Post ABC News poll conducted in March of 2006 62% of 
respondents disapproved of the job of Congress. These polls indicate a public mistrust of 
government with many citizens feeling government is corrupt, and does not represent them. 
Campaign finance reform is one tool to return trust in government to the people, and thus 
have lasting implications for a democratic society. As will be discussed in Chapter 2 many 
efforts have been made to reform the campaign finance system, however, as the above polls 
indicate more than 60 percent of the public still do not trust government. The high level of 
mistrust of government among the public leads to the conclusion that previous reform efforts 
have done little to help the image of government among the public. If campaign finance is to 
be a tool to bring about higher levels of trust in government among the people then it is 
critical that we understand the impact of previous reform efforts. If previous reform efforts 
have been successful in removing the undue influence of money from politics then campaign 
finance reform is likely to be unsuccessful in bringing about higher levels of trust in 
government among the people. However, if we find that campaign finance reforms have not 
been successful in removing the undue influence of money in politics then we need to 
understand why these reforms have not been successful. It is important to understand the 
strategies that interest groups employ when faced with legal restrictions on their contribution 
  
 
 
2 
activities, and therefore offer proposals that may close some of the loopholes in the current 
law, and in turn bring about higher levels of trust among the public. 
In a speech on September 27, 1999 in Nashua New Hampshire to announce his 
candidacy for President, Senator John McCain stated, “If we are to meet the challenges of 
our time, we must take the corrupting influence of special interest out of politics.” McCain 
has continued to serve as the primary spokesperson for campaign finance reform at the 
national level and has been the key actor in the recent passage of campaign finance reform 
with its centerpiece of banning soft money. 
 The McCain-Feingold campaign finance legislation attempts to fill in many of the 
existing loopholes that plague campaign finance laws passed in the 1970s. However, despite 
the bipartisan support the act received, it still has failed to achieve many of its goals, and has 
often left supporters with results that were not as successful in changing the undue influence 
of money in politics as supporters had hoped. For example, Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, 
a supporter of passage of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform, spoke on the 
Senate floor in March 2002 and stated, “The political landscape will change when this bill 
takes effect.” Levin continued by stating, “It will be filled with more people and less 
influence; more contributors and smaller contributions; more democracy and less elitism.”   
Additionally, despite many challenges to the law, which resulted in a 298 page Supreme 
Court opinion, many issues remain unresolved1.  
Despite the many challenges to the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 
2002, as well as previous reform efforts, the courts have consistently supported the 
constitutionality of contribution limits. In the landmark Supreme Court case Buckley v. 
                                                 
1
 See the 2003 Supreme Court Decision McConnell, United States Senator, Et Al. v. Federal Election 
Commission Et Al. [02-1674]   
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Valeo in 1976, the court upheld the constitutionality of limitations on contributions to 
candidates for federal office. In their ruling, the court stated, "These limitations, along with 
the disclosure provisions, constitute the Act's primary weapons against the reality or 
appearance of improper influence stemming from the dependence of candidates on large 
campaign contributions.” This decision was reconfirmed in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri 
Government PAC in 2000, in which the court upheld Missouri's contribution limits to state 
campaigns. Through their decisions, the courts have recognized the importance of removing 
the undue influence, or at least the appearance of undue influence, of money from the 
political system. The courts have found that the interest of society in controlling the 
influence of money in the political system is more important than an individual’s right to 
give unlimited money to a political candidate.  
The debate over McCain-Feingold and the subsequent court battles show the 
importance of understanding the impact of campaign finance reforms. The courts have 
clearly supported the right, and importance of government attempts to control the undue 
influence, or the appearance of undue influence, of money in the political system. An 
understanding of the impact of reforms before they are enacted is important to prevent 
reforms that fail to remove the undue influence of money from politics. The states have 
implemented a variety of different reforms. The variation in reforms at the state level 
provides an opportunity to study a variety of reforms that have not been implemented at the 
national level.  
 The ramifications of campaign finance reforms are important to a democratic 
society. Reforms play an important role in government’s effectiveness in representing its 
citizens. Supporters of reforms, such as those behind the McCain-Feingold legislation, 
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predicted the legislation would reduce the role of money in politics, make elections more 
competitive, reduce corruption in politics, and increase voter turnout. However, opponents 
argued that the legislation did not make things better and in some cases even made things 
worse. For example, opponents argued that the ban on soft money, at the center of McCain-
Feingold, merely resulted in the shift of contributions from political parties to 527 groups. 
Contributions from 527 groups have resulted in a controversy over the effectiveness of 
McCain-Feingold. Supporters argue that the legislation was not flawed, but that the FEC 
made an incorrect interpretation when it came to 527’s. On the other hand, opponents argue 
that no legislation will be able to close all campaign finance loopholes. These groups were 
named after a loophole in the tax code that allows them to receive tax-exempt contributions 
for any amount from any source. The actions of political action committees have the 
potential of resulting in policy outcomes not supported by a majority of citizens. If it is 
important for the will of majority to prevail over the will of a minority, then it is critical to 
understand the implications of campaign finance reforms as fully as possible.  
 There are many critical questions concerning campaign finance. One question of 
concern is: What are the motivations of contributors to campaigns? Are contributors giving 
money with the hope of influencing election outcomes or are they attempting to influence 
legislative outcomes? The answer to this question is critical as it plays an important role in 
how campaign finance is structured. Reform efforts to reduce the role, and influence of 
money are different from reform efforts to reduce the influence of money in the legislative 
process. For example, reform efforts that limit television ads close to the election attempt to 
reduce the impact of money from the electoral process. On the other hand, reforms limiting 
contributions during a legislative session are an attempt to remove the influence of money 
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from the legislative process. Additionally, some reform efforts, such as contribution limits, 
are an attempt to limit the effect of money in both the electoral and legislative arenas. An 
understanding of the motivation, and behavior of contributors will allow us to better target 
reform efforts to achieve intended consequences.  
 An additional question of concern surrounding campaign finance is how effective 
campaign contributions are at removing the undue influence of money from the legislative 
process. It is extremely important to understand the impact of money on legislative votes in 
order to make more informed reform proposals. If money is not influential in deciding how a 
legislator should vote, then reform efforts are less important since contributions do not make 
a difference. On the other hand, if money is influential in the decision-making process then I 
can examine solutions to remove the influence of money from the process.  
 In this dissertation, I focus on two primary questions. First, what are the motivations 
of campaign contributors? Second, what is the impact of legal restrictions on contribution 
patterns? More specifically, this dissertation examines the patterns of contributions in nine 
state legislatures, to see if increases in contributions occur close to major legislative votes as 
well as close to the election. This analysis will provide a better understanding of the motives 
of contributors.  Gaining a better understanding of the motives of contributors is essential in 
understanding the impact of interest group activity on representation in a democratic society.  
The pattern of campaign contributions under legal restrictions is a second focus of 
this dissertation. I primarily focus on the impact of laws, which prohibit or limit 
contributions during legislative sessions, on the strategies employed by interest groups. 
When faced with session limits, do interest groups simply withdraw from the legislative 
process or do they employ alternative strategies that still allow them to influence policy 
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outcomes?  When a limit is placed on contributions during the legislative session, the PAC 
has several alternative strategies they may follow. First, they may decide not to give a 
contribution to the legislator. The session limit will increase the time difference between 
legal contributions and legislative votes. The increase distance between the legislative vote 
and the contribution may make it more difficult to influence the outcome of the legislation 
and therefore the interest group elects not to contribute. Second, a PAC may shift their 
contributions to the election season. Third, they may shift their contributions to immediately 
before the legislative session begins in the hope of influencing legislative outcomes during 
the session. Finally, the PAC may choose to give a contribution to the legislator at the 
completion of the legislative session as a reward for support during that time.  
 An examination of campaign finance reforms at the state level offers an opportunity 
to understand the impact of reform efforts not possible at the national level. The states have 
enacted a variety of different reforms. The states, therefore, serve as laboratories to 
understand the effectiveness of different reforms. For example, some states place limits on 
contributions during the legislative session while others do not, thus providing an 
opportunity to use the differences across states to study the impact of session limits on the 
strategies of interest groups. 
Some states such as Illinois place few restrictions on who can give contributions, the 
amount of those contributions, and when those contributions can be given. On the other 
hand, states such as Georgia placed a variety of restrictions on contributions such as 
contribution limits, who can give money, and when contributions can be given. An 
examination of contribution patterns at the state level provides us the opportunity to examine 
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what occurs in states with and without certain restrictions during the same period, thereby 
serving as a control group.   
 Despite all the advantages of examining contribution patterns at the state level, the 
majority of research has focused on the national level with little attention paid to the states. 
This dissertation addresses the gap in the campaign finance literature at the state level, and 
uses the analytical advantages of the states to help better understand the impact of campaign 
finance reforms.   
There are several additional compelling reasons to study campaign finance at the 
state level. First, a state-level examination will help provide a greater understanding of how 
legislative structure affects campaign contributions. For example, the United States 
Congress is a professional legislative body occupied by career politicians. On the other 
hand, many states have amateur legislatures that have little in common with the national 
government. A state level examination will allow us to gain some purchase on how these 
structural differences impact contribution decisions.  Additionally, the variety of policy and 
political contexts within the states allows us to gain more empirical leverage on questions of 
campaign finance than possible at the congressional level (Mooney 2001). Replicating 
national level findings at the state level provides more support for theories at the national 
level (Hamm and Squire 2001). Finally, state legislative sessions and elections, have a much 
lower profile than national elections. It is possible, given this low profile among the public, 
money could play a greater role influencing voting behavior since legislators do not have to 
be as concerned with public opinion and the cost of a decision at election time. Mayhew 
(1974) identified re-election as the primary motivation for members of Congress; hence, 
members of Congress are attempting to maximize the probability of their re-election. Money 
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and votes are two of the most important factors in re-election; therefore, candidates attempt 
to maximize both the amount of money received as well as the number of votes. A legislator 
has to weigh the cost of voting for the position of the contributor against the loss of votes 
during the election. Since state legislators receive less coverage than their national 
counterparts it is possible that state legislative contributions are more successful than 
contributions at the national level. 
The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the motivations of contributors giving 
campaign contributions, and to determine the strategies employed by PACs when faced with 
legal restrictions. Within the discipline, it has been suggested that there are two main 
motivations for campaign contributions. Particularistic2 contributors give in the hope of 
influencing legislation (Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-
Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox and Munger 1999; Chappell 1982; Jones and Hopkins 
1985; Hendrie, Salant and Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and 
Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990; Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). Universalistic 
contributors, on the other hand, give in the hope of affecting electoral outcomes (Fuchs, 
Adler and Mitchell 2000; Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Morton and Cameron 1992; 
Mueller 1989; Mutz 1995; McAdams and Green 2000; Poole and Romer 1985; Sabato 1985; 
Snyder 1990; Welch 1974 and 1980). Given the analytical advantages of the states in 
understanding the impact of campaign contributions in a variety of legal and political 
contexts, this research will provide greater knowledge of the motivations of contributors and 
the relevance of each of these two approaches through an analysis of contributions in nine 
states. Furthermore, understanding interest group behavior is critical to understanding the 
                                                 
2
 Particularistic contributors can be further classified into quid pro quo contributors who give with the hope of 
influencing legislative outcomes or renters who give contributions as insurance to keep legislators in office that 
will be more likely to support the contributor when future legislation is considered.  
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impact of money on policy outcomes in the states. While it is beyond the scope of this 
research to understand if money given to a legislator is successful in achieving its intended 
goal, the appearance of undue influence has the potential of resulting in a mistrust of 
government and increase feeling of the illegitimacy of decisions in a democratic society. 
Reforms such as session limits may remove the appearance of interest groups attempting to 
exercising undue influence on policy outcomes, however, it is critical to understand the true 
impact of these laws if we are to understand if appearance equals true reform and reality. 
Additionally, the dissertation offers suggestions on what reforms are most likely to 
be successful so future reforms will be more successful. In Chapter 2, I provide an overview 
of the history of campaign finance reforms in the United States. This overview of past 
reform efforts provides a better understanding of previous attempts, thus enabling us to 
place current reform efforts into a proper historical context. Furthermore, this overview 
points out the importance of understanding how pass reform efforts have not always 
achieved their intended outcomes, and that further research needs to attempt to understand 
the strategies employed by contributors when faced with legal restrictions placed on their 
actions. 
In Chapter 3, I outline the existing research on campaign finance. First, I examine the 
literature addressing the linkage between spending and election outcomes. Second, I outline 
the existing studies on the motivations of contributors. This literature tends to focus on the 
distinction between particularistic contributors, who give money with the hope of 
influencing legislative outcomes, and universalistic contributors who give money with the 
hope of influencing election outcomes. Finally, I provide an overview of the literature that 
addresses questions of the link between contributions and legislator behavior.  
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In Chapter 4, I introduce my research question and hypotheses for the dissertation. 
This dissertation first attempts to answer the question of why contributors give money to 
state legislators. It is expected that the number of contributions to state legislators, will be 
greater in the two months prior to the election when compared to the proximity to a major 
legislative vote. However, the proximity to a major legislative vote is also expected to be 
significant in explaining contribution patterns. A second question of interest is the impact of 
session limits on contribution patterns. It is expected that PACs in states with session limits 
on contributions will engage in a strategy where they provide contributions immediately 
prior to the beginning of the legislative session in the hope of influencing legislative votes 
during the session.  
 In Chapter 5, I introduce and test a model to explain campaign contributions in state 
legislatures. This model is tested across twenty-five bills in nine states. It is based on the 
work of Thomas Stratmann (1992, 1998, 2000) who finds at the national level that 
contributions increase before important legislative votes. This dissertation builds on the 
work of Stratmann by expanding the study to the state level, and to a larger variety of 
legislation. The model introduced in Chapter 5 allows a determination of the motives of 
contributors. It also allows us to determine how PACs respond when faced with session 
limits on contributions. Understanding the response of PACs to obstacles placed in front of 
them is important in providing an understanding of the link between policy outcomes and 
interest group activities, and the impact of those outcomes on public perceptions of the 
political system.  
 In Chapter 6, I present the results of my analysis. These findings provide evidence of 
the pattern of contributions surrounding both the general and primary election and under 
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what context we would expect the greatest increase in contributions surrounding the general 
election and under what circumstances we would expect to see the greatest increase in 
contributions surrounding the primary election. Additionally, these findings provide an 
understanding of the role of legislative votes on contribution patterns, and address the 
question of if the greatest number of contributions comes close to those major legislative 
votes. The findings presented in Chapter 6 also provide us with a better understanding of the 
action of PACs when faced with session limits and if those limits are successful in keeping 
money out of the political system.    
 In Chapter 7, I discuss the implications of the findings from this dissertation. I 
provide evidence of whether PACs are universalistic or particularistic contributors to state 
legislators and the reforms most successful in removing the influence of money from 
politics. Finally, I offer suggestions for future research that will advance our understanding 
of the impact of campaign finance reforms. 
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Chapter 2: The History of Campaign Finance Reforms 
 
 Throughout the history of the United States, many efforts have been put forth in an 
attempt to remove the influence of money from politics3. These efforts have, in many cases, 
been ineffective in completely achieving their intended goals. For example, Congress placed 
contribution limits on the amount of money an individual or PAC may give to a federal 
candidate. However, contributors were often able to circumvent these limits through 
bundling and loopholes allowing for unlimited soft money to political parties. Many of these 
reform efforts have resulted in disappointment for their supporters. Reforms implemented 
without a complete as possible understanding of their effects may result in unintended 
consequences not successful in removing the undue influence of money from politics. While 
it is not possible to fully understand all of the ramifications of any reform proposal, or how 
the courts will respond to the law, we should strive to understand the ramifications of any 
proposal as thoroughly as possible prior to implementation to minimize the number of 
unintended consequences brought about by an reform. A historical overview of campaign 
finance shows problems that plagued previous reform efforts, and reiterates the importance 
of understanding the ramifications of previous reform efforts before enacting additional 
reforms. Additionally, the overview provided in this chapter illustrates the extent 
contributors will go to in order to circumvent the intent of the law, and illustrates that 
despite the many efforts to reform the system many citizens still do not trust their 
government. This lack of trust in government illustrates that previous reform efforts have 
been unsuccessful in restoring trust in government or that additional steps aside from the 
                                                 
3
 For an additional overview of the history of campaign finance reform see Goidel, Gross and Shields (1999); 
Thayer (1973); Overracker (1932); Heard (1960); and Dwyre and Farrar-Myers (2001) 
For a summary of important events in the history of campaign finance please see Table 2.5. at the end of this 
chapter 
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campaign finance system are necessary to remove the perceived notion of corruption in 
government among the people. 
In this chapter, I first examine national level reforms. These reform efforts began in 
the 19th century and continue until today. Second, I examine state level reforms. While 
reform efforts at the national level are extremely important, the majority of elections in the 
United States are state and local elections; therefore, an understanding of state level reforms 
is critical to understand all efforts to remove the influence of money from politics. Finally, I 
examine specific campaign finance laws in nine states that are part of this study. An 
understanding of the campaign finance laws in these states is critical to understanding the 
pattern of campaign contributions in them. In order to understand where we should head in 
the future, it is critical that we understand what occurred in the past. An examination of past 
campaign finance reforms efforts places us in a better position to provide policy 
recommendations for future legislation to help restore trust in government. 
  
 1. Campaign Finance at the Federal Level 
 Campaign finance has received a great deal of attention in the media recently. 
However, the issue has been a permanent part of the political landscape for several 
centuries. Money has played a role in politics since the time of George Washington. In a 
controversial move, Washington used his own money to buy alcoholic drinks for voters in 
Virginia. Washington’s attempt to influence the voters was a source of controversy and early 
in the history of the United States pointed to the need for campaign finance reforms. 
However, reform efforts would not come until the middle of the nineteenth century. 
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Initial efforts at campaign reform focused on the solicitation of money from 
government workers. Such solicitation had become a way of life because of the introduction 
of the “spoils system” under President Jackson.  Thus, the first effort to regulate campaign 
finance came in 1868 with passage of the Naval Appropriations Bill. This legislation 
prohibited officers and employees of the government from soliciting money from naval yard 
workers. However, parties continued to receive money from other federal employees and 
political appointees.  
The Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act of 1883 extended the provisions of the 
Naval Bill that prohibited solicitations by applying them to all federal civil service workers. 
These bills were a major step forward in the regulation of campaign finance because prior to 
the legislation, workers often had to give to political parties in order to keep their jobs. The 
necessity to provide a contribution in order to keep one’s job only served to increase public 
sentiment that the system was corrupt, and not responsive to the people. While resulting in a 
reduction of party reliance on government employees, the act again failed to remove money 
from the system, and merely shifted the financing burden of campaigns from individuals to 
businesses with a stake in federal policy outcomes. The importance of business interest in 
the financing of campaigns would continue to increase through the 1880s and 1890s.  
 The next major step in advancing campaign finance reform came in 1907 with 
passage of the Tillman Act. The act attempted to prohibit corporations and national 
chartered banks from contributing directly to federal candidates. The Tillman Act was an 
additional effort at attempting to remove corruption or at least the appearance of corruption 
from the political system. However, the legislation proved largely ineffective due to weak 
enforcement methods set forth in the legislation. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1910 
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was another in a series of largely ineffective attempts to regulate campaign finance. The act 
attempted to establish disclosure requirements for U.S. House candidates. In 1911, the act 
was extended to included Senate candidates and expanded to include expenditure limits for 
congressional candidates. This legislation once again proved largely ineffective due to the 
lack of mechanisms for verification and enforcement. Hence, little advancement occurred to 
reduce corruption and the perception of corruption in the political system.  
 In 1925, the Federal Corrupt Practices Act was revised, but once again, legislation 
would be routinely ignored. The act attempted to revise previous campaign reform 
legislation concerning spending limits and disclosure. Since the power of enforcement 
resided in Congress, the Act was ignored. It was not until 1967 that Clerk of the House, 
former Congressman W. Pat Jennings, collected campaign finance reports for the first time. 
However, his list of violators was ignored by the Justice Department.  The lack of 
enforcement of the Corrupt Practices Act served to further entrench corruption as part of the 
political culture, and therefore resulting in more disillusionment among the public. 
 In 1940, the Hatch Amendments were passed to extend previous legislation. The 
amendments established a limit of $5000 per year on individual contributions to a federal 
candidate or political committee. An individual could, however, give $5000 to multiple 
committees working for the same candidate. This loophole resulted in legislation that was 
ineffective in limiting the influence of interest groups, and corruption in the political 
process.  Additionally, the Hatch amendments extended campaign finance law to cover 
primary as well as general elections and prohibited contributions to federal candidates from 
individuals and businesses working for the federal government.  In 1943, the Smith-
Connally Act extended the prohibition on contributions to federal candidates that already 
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existed for corporations and interstate banks to include unions. The extension of the act to 
cover unions was an effort to even the playing field across different types of contributors, 
however, contributors were able to find loopholes in a law that was not actively enforced 
thus allowing corruption to continue.  
 In 1944, the first political action committee was formed by the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations to raise money for the re-election of President Roosevelt. The PAC money 
came from voluntary contributions from union members, and therefore was legal under the 
Smith-Connally Act that prohibited money going to candidates from union dues. The 
formation of the first PAC provides an illustration of how loopholes in the campaign finance 
law has allowed interest groups to circumvent the law, and therefore resulting in a growing 
concern about the public that the political system is corrupt, and is not representative of the 
view of the majority but only of a select minority. The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made 
permanent the ban on contributions to federal candidates from unions, corporations, and 
interstate banks and extended the prohibitions to include primary elections.  
 Until 1971, the Corrupt Practices Act served as the basis for campaign finance law; 
however, with passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971 a new framework for 
the regulation of campaign financing was established. This act required full and timely 
disclosure of contributions, set limits on media advertising, established limits on 
contributions from candidates and their families, allowed unions and corporations to solicit 
voluntary contributions, and allowed union and corporate treasury money to be used for 
overhead in operating political action committees.     
 The 1971 Revenue Act created a public campaign fund for eligible presidential 
candidates through a voluntary one-dollar check off on federal income tax. Additionally, the 
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act provided for a $50 tax deduction or a $12.50 credit, later raised to $50, for contributions 
to state, local or federal candidate. However, this provision has since been eliminated. The 
revenue act of 1971 was an important attempt in trying to remove the undue influence of 
money from the political system through providing public funds for campaigns. However, 
the public has not been very receptive about the ideal of public money going to fund 
campaigns, and therefore the majority of taxpayers have not participated in the one-dollar 
check off on the federal income tax form. Citizens, therefore while decrying corruption 
within the system are in general reluctant to pay for campaigns. This reluctance on the part 
of taxpayers creates a dilemma for reformers who have to try alternative forms of reforming 
the system such as limitations on contributions during legislative sessions. 
 The most significant campaign reforms came in the aftermath of the Watergate 
scandal. This legislation serves as the basis for most of our federal campaign finance law 
today. The Federal Campaign Act Amendment of 1974 provided matching funds for 
presidential primaries, public funds for presidential nominating conventions, set spending 
limits for presidential and congressional primaries and elections, and created a $1000 
individual per election contribution limit and a $5000 PAC limit. Additionally, the 
legislation abolished limits on media advertising and created the Federal Election 
Commission.   
 Provisions of the Federal Campaign Act of 1974 were challenged in the courts as 
being an unconstitutional violation of free speech. The 1976 decision Buckley v. Valeo 
upheld disclosure requirements, limits on individual contributions, voluntary public 
financing, and the President’s authority to appoint commissioners to the Federal Election 
Commission as constitutional. However, the court ruled that limits on candidate 
  
 
 
18 
expenditures are unconstitutional unless the candidate accepts public financing and that it 
was unconstitutional to place limits on personal and “independent” expenditures.  
 In 1976, in the wake of the Buckley decision, Congress reconsidered the 1974 
Federal Campaign Act and sought to bring the law in line with the Supreme Court decision. 
Amendments to the 1974 act limited individual contributions to national parties to $20,000 
per year, and individual contributions to PAC’s to $5000 per year. In 1979, additional 
amendments increased the in-kind contributions from $500 to $1000, raised the threshold for 
reporting contributions from $100 to $200, prohibited the FEC from performing random 
audits, and allowed state and local parties to spend unlimited amounts on campaign 
materials used by volunteers and on voter registration and get-out-the-vote campaigns.  The 
soft money loophole continued a line of failed efforts to remove corruption from the 
political system, and thus led to the need for future legislation designed to close this 
loophole within the existing campaign finance law.                                  
 The most recent effort to reform campaign finance is the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act, otherwise known as McCain-Feingold. The act attempted to fill in loopholes 
that existed in campaign finance laws passed in the 1970s. The law restricts the amount of 
money parties can give to candidates and the amount that individuals can give to parties. 
The act increases individual contribution amounts to $2,000 per election and to the national 
party committees to $25,000. However, these limits are adjusted by a formula that penalizes 
wealthy candidates for spending their own money. Additionally, the act attempts to control 
the timing of ads from independent groups for federal office. The efforts under the 2002 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act were successful in curtailing unregulated soft money to 
political parties, however, the political party in many cases has been replaced by 527 groups 
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as recipients of soft money. These groups are tax-exempt under section 527 of the Internal 
Revenue code and they are often engaged in voter mobilization efforts, issue advocacy, and 
so forth with the use of soft money in many cases.  
 Despite the claims of supporters that the Bipartisan Campaign Act would decrease 
the role of money in elections and make elections more competitive, it may have in fact 
made things worse, as we have seen in previous efforts to decrease the role of money in 
politics. For example, prior to the first implementation of contribution limits in 1976, the 
1974 election saw 12% of House members lose their reelection attempts compared to 4% in 
1976 and 6% in 1978. Additionally, in 2004 only 2% of House incumbents lost their re-
election attempts, which is similar to incumbent reelection rates prior to the implementation 
of the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Act. An overview of incumbent re-election rates since 
19644 reveal that incumbents are consistently re-elected at very high rates, and in fact 
incumbents may be becoming even more secure in recent elections (see Table 2.0). 
Additionally, states legislatures faced with similar restrictions as outlined in McCain-
Feingold have seen an increase in the percentage of votes received by the incumbent (Lott 
2004).  
TABLE 2.0. ABOUT HERE 
 There are many possible explanations of why campaign finance reforms have not 
been as successful as its authors may have wished. First, incumbents have built-in 
advantages such as better name recognition and the ability to use governmental resources at 
their disposal to enhance electoral success. Second, incumbents have more connections and 
                                                 
4
 There is a great deal of debate over whether elections have become more or less competitive. Incumbent 
reelection rates are only one component in that debate. While incumbents are being elected at higher rates than 
ever to Congress many state legislatures have become much more competitive with Republicans gaining 
numbers in many state legislatures.   
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are in a better position to be successful in raising a lot of money through small donations. 
Conversely, the incumbent may be in a position that makes it necessary to place more 
reliance on larger contributions from fewer donors.  
 Despite the possible explanations for the failure of reform, the long history of 
campaign finance reforms reveals the importance of evaluating reforms before they are 
implemented on a large scale to see any possible unforeseen ramifications. Furthermore, an 
overview of previous campaign finance efforts reveals a constant effort to remove 
corruption and the perception of corruption from the political system. These efforts, 
however, for the most part have been unsuccessful with the majority of the public still 
cynical when it comes to trusting in government. In addition to reforms at the national level, 
the states have implemented many different campaign finance reforms. These reform efforts 
provide excellent opportunities to understand the impact of policy changes and to offer more 
effective policy recommendations. 
 
2. State Campaign Finance Reform 
 Campaign reform has not been restricted to the national level. By 1980, most states 
required some sort of candidate disclosure, with half of the states having limits on 
contributions and 16 states had some type of public financing.5 Since 1990, the majority of 
states have reformed their campaign finance laws in response to rising campaign costs, 
under-funded challengers, the increased influence of large donors, and the growing influence 
of independent expenditures (see Tables 2.1 to 2.3). The innovative approaches taken by the 
states, such as strict contribution limits, spending ceilings, and public financing of 
                                                 
5
 For an overview of campaign finance reform in the states see Alexander (1976); Jones (1981, 1986, 1991); 
Neal (1992); Herrmann and Michaelson (1994); Malbin and Gais (1998); Gross and Goidel (2004).  
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campaigns serve as models for national reform. However, as is the case with federal law, 
many of the laws enacted by the states have undergone scrutiny by the courts and declared 
unconstitutional in many cases. The response by the courts has often led to more unique 
innovations such as providing free broadcast time to candidates. These new innovations 
broadened the campaign finance debate to include a completely new way of thinking about 
campaign financing. 
TABLES 2.1. to 2.3 ABOUT HERE 
In 1991, ten states passed laws establishing or reducing contribution limits. 
Additionally, from 1992 to 1996 twenty-three states and the District of Columbia revised 
their campaign finance laws, including some states that made major changes in their existing 
systems.6 In 1980, twenty-three states had limits on individual contributions while sixteen 
states had limits on PAC contributions. The number of states with individual contributions 
limits increased to thirty-four states by 1996. Additionally, by 1996 thirty-two states 
imposed limits on PAC contributions. The increased attention to campaign reform 
legislation by legislators has been accompanied by an interest of scholars to determine the 
impact of enacted legislation.  The elapse of time since the passage of many reform laws has 
allowed scholars to begin to assess the impact of campaign reform. In the next chapter, I 
examine research that attempts to understand the consequences of reform efforts. Finally, in 
this section I provide a broad overview of campaign reforms in the states. This overview 
reveals a variety of different approaches toward campaign finance reform in the states. In the 
next section, I focus more specifically on the laws of the nine states included in this study. 
                                                 
6
 Between 1992 and 1996 California, Colorado and Kentucky passed comprehensive reform packages. Maine 
and Nebraska established public financing for state elections and Minnesota and Hawaii revised their public 
financing programs. 
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The differences in their regulations provide an opportunity to understand the impact 
campaign regulations in a variety of different legal contexts. 
 
3. Campaign Finance Laws in the Nine States Sample 
There are a variety of different campaign finance laws across these states7. Some 
states have very open systems with few restrictions placed on the actions of contributors. On 
the other hand, in some states numerous restrictions on contributions exist in the hope of 
removing the undue influence of money from the political system. These restrictions include 
limitations on the amount of contributions given, when contributions can be given and 
received, and who can give contributions. The states in this study include the entire 
spectrum of campaign finance laws. Some states, such as Illinois, have laws that allow 
nearly unlimited contributions, while others such as Wisconsin place many restrictions on 
the actions of contributors.  
In table 2.4, I identify campaign finance restrictions across six common types of 
restrictions placed on campaign contributions in the states in this study. Each state is given a 
ranking of 1, 2 or 3 with 1 indicating that type of contribution is prohibited, 2 indicating 
restrictions placed on that type of contribution and 3 indicating no restrictions placed on that 
type of contribution. If we weigh each of these types of contributions the same, Illinois is 
clearly the least restrictive when it comes to campaign contributions with Wisconsin the 
most restrictive state in the sample. This chart clearly illustrates the diversity of laws in the 
sample in this study. This diversity allows us to study the impact of a variety of different 
                                                 
7For additional information on campaign finance laws in the states see the National Conference of State 
Legislatures web site at  http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/about/campfin.htm 
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campaign finance laws, and their success at removing undue influence and the corruption of 
money from the political system. 
TABLE 2.4. ABOUT HERE 
 
3.1. Illinois 
 As indicated in table 2.4, Illinois places few restrictions on campaign contribution in 
comparison to other states. Illinois does not place limits on contribution amounts, as is the 
case with California and Georgia. However, Illinois does prohibit anonymous contributions 
and places limitations on fundraising during a legislative session. Candidates for the General 
Assembly may not conduct a fundraiser within 50 miles of Springfield during the session 
unless his or her district is within 50 miles of Springfield, however, contributors allowed to 
take contributions during the legislative session. Additionally, Illinois allows for the direct 
contribution of campaign donations by corporations, thus making it unnecessary for political 
committees to be established to donate to a candidate. 
 
3.2. New Mexico  
 New Mexico has very few restrictions on contribution limits. Individuals, 
corporations, and PACs are able to give unlimited amounts of money to candidates. The 
only restrictions placed on the amount of contributions are that anonymous contributions in 
excess of $100 may not be accepted. Furthermore, the aggregate amount of anonymous 
contributions that may be accepted by a candidate cannot exceed $2,000 in statewide races 
or $500 in all other races. However, New Mexico does prohibit contributions from being 
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given during a legislative session. This is the only restriction on campaign contributions in 
New Mexico across the six contribution restrictions listed in table 2.4. 
 
3.3. Utah 
 The campaign finance laws in Utah mirror what is seen in New Mexico. Individuals, 
corporations, and PACs can give an unlimited amount to candidates. Additionally, in New 
Mexico all contributions during the legislative session are prohibited, thus making the laws 
in Utah slightly more restrictive than in Illinois.  
 
3.4. California  
 In comparison to other states such as Georgia and Wisconsin, California has fewer 
legal restrictions on campaign contributions. However, California places more restrictions 
on contributions than Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah. California places restrictions on all 
types of contributions listed in table 2.4 with the exception of contributions during the 
legislative session. Contributions over one hundred dollars may not be made in cash. 
Additionally, anonymous contributions must be less than one hundred dollars, and 
contributions may not be accepted or solicited from a foreign government. 
 Contributions from any person or political party, other than small contributor 
committees, are limited to $20,000 per election for governor, $5,000 for other statewide 
offices, and $3,000 for non-statewide offices. Additionally, these limits also apply to 
contributions given by one candidate to another candidate. For small contributor committees 
the limits are $20,000 for governor, $10,000 for statewide, office and $6,000 for non-
statewide offices.  
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Additionally, limits are placed on contributions to committees given for contributing 
to candidates for state office. Contributors, however, are not limited to the amount they may 
give to committees for non-election purposes. Contributions are limited to $5,000 to non-
party committees and to $25,000 for political party committees when the purpose of the 
contributions is to support the election of candidates for office. 
  
3.5. New York  
 The campaign finance laws in New York mirror those in California in that New York 
allows all of the types of contributions indicated in table 2.4.  In New York there is a 
formula based on the number of enrolled voters in a candidate’s party that determines the 
limit on the amount of a contribution that an individual can give to a gubernatorial 
candidate. However, the amount cannot be less than $5400 or more than $16,200 in a 
primary election or $33,900 in a general election.   
 In state legislative races, an individual can give a senate candidate $5,400 in the 
primary and $8,500 in the general election. A house candidate can be given $3,400 in both 
the primary and general elections. These same limits applied to individuals also apply to 
corporations and PACs. However, corporations are limited to a maximum total of $5,000 per 
year which makes some of the spending limits set forth previously a moot point. Individuals 
are limited to a total of $150,000 per year, while there are no limits placed on PACs. Finally, 
New York does not place restrictions on contributions given during the course of the 
legislative session. 
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3.6. South Carolina 
 South Carolina allows all types of contributions listed in table 2.4, however, the state 
places restrictions on those. The contribution limits in South Carolina are lower than is the 
case in New York and California. This difference may be the product of the fact that a 
legislative race is less costly in South Carolina than in New York and California. South 
Carolina limits corporations, PACs, and individuals to $3,500 per candidate per election for 
statewide offices. The limit for legislative candidates is only $1,000 per candidate per 
election. Political parties in South Carolina may not contribute more than $50,000 per 
election cycle to any candidate for a statewide office or more than $5,000 for any other 
candidate. Additionally, South Carolina prohibits lobbyists from giving contributions during 
a legislative session. 
 
3.7. Kentucky 
 In contrast to Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah, which allow unlimited contributions, 
Kentucky prohibits the direct contribution of campaign donations by corporations, thus 
resulting in the necessity of the formation of a political committee in order to contribute to a 
campaign. Kentucky places a $1,000 per election limit on individual contributions. 
Additionally, a person may give no more than $1,500 to all permanent committees and 
contributing organizations in a given year.  
 Restrictions are also made on the amount of contributions that can be given by 
political committees. Committees are limited to the greater of $10,000 per election cycle or 
50% of the total contributions received by the candidate. Furthermore, a slate of candidates 
may not accept a contribution during the 28 days immediately preceding or following a 
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primary or general election. Finally, no restrictions are placed on contributions given during 
legislative sessions. 
 
3.8. Georgia 
 Georgia has more restrictive campaign laws than all the other states in the sample 
with the exception of Wisconsin. Individuals, corporations, political committees, and 
political parties are limited to a $5,000 contribution in the primary and another $5,000 in the 
general election in races for statewide office. The limit drops to $2,000 in non-statewide 
races. Political parties are not subject to contributions or expenditures made by a party in 
support of the party ticket or a group of named candidates. 
 Georgia also places limits on contributions during legislative sessions. Members of 
the legislature are not allowed to accept contributions during the legislative session. They 
may accept funds received from a fundraising event during a legislative session, if the 
fundraiser took place prior to the legislative session.  Additionally, contribution restrictions 
are placed on certain regulated industries and public agencies. Any individual that acts on 
behalf of a public utility corporation regulated by the public service commission cannot 
contribute to a political campaign. 
 
3.9. Wisconsin 
 Wisconsin has the most restrictive campaign finance laws of any state in the sample. 
Wisconsin is the only state in the sample to prohibit contributions from unions as well as 
being one of only two states to prohibit contributions from corporations. Corporations are 
prohibited from giving directly to a candidate and may only give contributions through a 
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PAC. Wisconsin limits individuals to $10,000 per candidate per election in statewide races, 
$1,000 in state senate races and $500 in state house races. Additionally, individuals cannot 
give more than $10,000 per year to all candidates and PACs combined.  The limits for PACs 
are the same as those for individuals in state senate and house races, however, the limit for 
gubernatorial candidates is $43,128 for PACs. Gubernatorial candidates may only accept 
$485,190 from all committees during an election campaign. Senate candidates are limited to 
accepting $15,525 from committees during an election campaign while the limit is $7,763 
for house candidates. Corporations are prohibited from giving directly to a candidate and 
may only give contributions through a PAC. Finally, lobbyists are prohibited from giving 
contributions during a legislative session. 
 
3.10. Summary of the Nine State Sample 
 
 The nine states examined in this study cover a variety of different campaign finance 
laws (see Appendix A).  Three states in the sample allow unlimited donations by political 
action committees, individuals, and corporations. At the other end of the spectrum, two 
states prohibit contributions by corporations. Additionally, there is a wide range placed on 
contributions, with PAC’s limited to $1000 per election in Kentucky to unlimited 
contributions in Illinois, New Mexico, and Utah. In addition to differences in contribution 
limits across the states, four states allow contributions during a legislative session, three 
states prohibit contributions during the session, and two states prohibit contributions by 
lobbyists. The differences in limits during legislative sessions across the sample provide the 
opportunity to understand the strategies employed by political action committees faced with 
legal restrictions on contributions. For the purpose of this dissertation, I pay particular 
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attention to the impact of session limits on contribution patterns in state legislatures. A 
central focus of this dissertation is the reaction of PACs when faced with legal restrictions 
that prohibit when they can give money to legislators, and thus the success of session limits 
at removing corruption and the perception of corruption from the political system. 
 
4. Summary of Campaign Finance Laws 
 
The nine states examined in this study provide a diversity of campaign finance laws 
in addition to a diversity of legislative professionalism and geographical diversity. Four 
states in the sample allow unlimited contributions during legislative sessions, while the other 
five states prohibit or limit contributions during the legislative session. Additionally, three 
states in the sample allow unlimited contributions by corporations, labor unions, individuals, 
and political action committees. 
 This chapter has provided an overview of the history of campaign finance reforms in 
the United States at both the federal and the state level. Additionally, this chapter has 
introduced the campaign laws in the states examined in this study. Particular attention has 
been paid to contribution limits and session limits, which are significant for this dissertation. 
The overview of the history of campaign finance reveals a history of failed attempts with 
unintended consequences. This failed history points to the importance of fully examining 
reform efforts. An examination of state reform efforts in general, as well as the differences 
in the states considered in this study, reveals a variety of different reforms efforts and laws 
which can provide us with an opportunity to understand a variety of different reform efforts 
in different contexts.  
TABLE 2.5. ABOUT HERE 
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Table 2.0. US House Reelection Rates 
Year Reelection Rates 
1964 87% 
1966 88% 
1968 97% 
1970 85% 
1972 94% 
1974 88% 
1976 96% 
1978 94% 
1980 91% 
1982 90% 
1984 95% 
1986 98% 
1988 98% 
1990 96% 
1992 88% 
1994 90% 
1996 94% 
1998 98% 
2000 98% 
2002 96% 
2004 98% 
Note: The above numbers are derived from House election results provided in various 
editions of America Votes: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics; the 
World Almanac and Book of Facts and www.house.gov.  
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Table 2.1. Campaign Finance Reforms in the States 
Campaign Finance Reform Number of States 
Disclosure 50 States 
Contributions Limits on Individuals 37 States 
Contribution Limits on PACs 36 States 
Limits on money given to political parties 35 States 
Limits on Union Contributions 28 States 
Limits on Corporate Contributions 23 States 
Prohibition on Corporate Contributions 22 States 
Prohibition on Union Contribution 14 States 
Session Limits on all Contributions 14 States 
Session Limits on Lobbyist Contributions 11 States 
Public Financing of Campaigns (Optional) 11 States 
Spending Limits 0 States 
Notes: The Supreme Court ruled in the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo that spending limits  
 were unconstitutional unless they are optional 
Taken from the Conference of State Legislatures www.ncsl.org 
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Table 2.2. States without limits on contributions 
States with no limit 
on individual 
contributions 
States with no 
limit on PAC 
contributions 
States with no 
limits on 
corporation 
contributions 
States with no 
limits on 
union 
contributions 
States with 
no limits on 
contributions 
to political 
parties 
Alabama Alabama Illinois Alabama Arkansas 
Illinois Illinois New Mexico Illinois Florida 
Indiana  Indiana Oregon Iowa Georgia 
Iowa Iowa Utah Mississippi Idaho 
Mississippi Mississippi Virginia New Mexico Illinois 
Nebraska New Mexico  Oregon Maine 
New Mexico North Dakota  Utah Missouri 
North Dakota Oregon  Virginia Nebraska 
Oregon Pennsylvania   Nevada 
Pennsylvania South Dakota   New Mexico 
Texas Texas   North 
Dakota 
Utah Utah   Oregon 
Virginia Virginia   Pennsylvania 
 Wyoming   Utah 
    Virginia 
Note: Taken from the Conference of State Legislatures: www.ncsl.org 
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Table 2.3. Session limits on contributions 
States with session limits on all 
contributions 
States with limits on lobbyist contributions 
during the legislative session 
Alabama Arizona 
Alaska Colorado 
Florida Connecticut 
Georgia Iowa 
Indiana Kansas 
Maine Louisiana 
Maryland Minnesota 
Nevada North Carolina 
New Mexico South Carolina 
Tennessee Vermont 
Texas Wisconsin 
Utah  
Virginia  
Washington  
Note: Taken from the Conference of State Legislatures: www.ncsl.org 
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance  
Important Events Year Importance Loopholes 
Naval Appropriations 
Bill 
1868 Prohibited officers 
and employees of the 
government from 
soliciting money 
from naval yard 
workers 
 
Pendleton Civil Service 
Reform Act  
1883 Extended Naval 
Appropriations Bill to 
all federal civil 
service workers 
 
President Theodore 
Roosevelt 
1905 Argued for a ban on 
all political 
contributions by 
corporations 
 
President Theodore 
Roosevelt 
1907 Called for public 
financing of federal 
candidates via 
candidates' political 
parties 
 
Tillman Act 1907 Prohibited 
corporations and 
national chartered 
banks from making 
contributions directly 
to federal candidates 
Contained no 
provision for 
public financing  
 
Ban on 
corporate giving 
was easily 
evaded or 
ignored 
The Federal Corrupt 
Practices Act  
1910 Establish disclosure 
requirements for U.S. 
House candidates 
Lack of 
Enforcement  
Extension of the Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act of 
1910 
1911 Extended to included 
Senate candidates and 
expanded to include 
expenditure limits for 
congressional 
candidates 
Lack of 
Enforcement 
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued) 
Important Events Year Importance Loopholes 
National Democratic 
Party Platform 
1924 Included a plank, 
proposed by William 
Jennings Bryan, 
calling for federal 
candidates to be 
furnished "reasonable 
means of publicity at 
public expense." 
 
Revision of Federal 
Corrupt Practices Act  
1925 Revised previous 
campaign reform 
legislation 
concerning spending 
limits and disclosure 
Lack of 
Enforcement 
Procedures 
Hatch Amendments 1940 Established a limit of 
$5000 per year on 
individual 
contributions to a 
federal candidate or 
political committee 
Individual could 
give $5000 to 
multiple 
committees 
working for the 
same candidate 
Hatch Amendments 1940 Extended campaign 
finance law to cover 
primary as well as 
general elections  
 
Hatch Amendments 1940 Prohibited 
contributions to 
federal candidates 
from individuals and 
businesses working 
for the federal 
government 
Unions not 
prohibited from 
giving 
contributions to 
federal 
candidates but 
businesses and 
corporations 
were prohibited 
Smith-Connally Act 1943 Extended the 
prohibition on 
contributions to 
federal candidates 
that already existed 
for corporations and 
interstate banks to 
include unions. 
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued) 
Important Events Year Importance Loopholes 
First Political Action 
Committee Formed 
1944 Congress of 
Industrial 
Organizations formed 
to raise money for the 
re-election of 
President Roosevelt. 
PAC money 
came from 
voluntary 
contributions 
from union 
members, and 
therefore was 
not illegal under 
the Smith-
Connally Act 
that prohibited 
money going to 
candidates from 
union dues. 
Taft-Hartley Act  
 
1947 Made permanent the 
ban on contributions 
to federal candidates 
from unions, 
corporations, and 
interstate banks and 
extended the 
prohibitions to 
include primary 
elections. 
 
Collection of Campaign 
Finance Reports for first 
time 
1967 Clerk of the House, 
former Congressman 
W. Pat Jennings, 
collected campaign 
finance reports. 
Violations of 
law not 
enforced by the 
Justice 
Department 
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued) 
Important Events Year Importance Loopholes 
Federal Election 
Campaign Act  
1971 Required full and 
timely disclosure of 
contributions 
 
Set limits on media 
advertising 
 
Established limits on 
contributions from 
candidates and their 
families 
 
Allowed unions and 
corporations to solicit 
voluntary 
contributions 
 
Allowed union and 
corporate treasury 
money to be used for 
overhead in operating 
political action 
committees.    
 
 
Revenue Act 1971 Created a public 
campaign fund for 
eligible presidential 
candidates through a 
voluntary one-dollar 
check off on federal 
income tax.  
 
Provided for a $50 
tax deduction or a 
$12.50 credit, later 
raised to $50, for 
contributions to state, 
local or federal 
candidate.(Later 
Eliminated) 
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued) 
Important Events Year Importance Loopholes 
The Federal Campaign 
Act Amendment 
1974 Provided matching 
funds for presidential 
primaries, public 
funds for presidential 
nominating 
conventions 
 
Set spending limits 
for presidential and 
congressional 
primaries and 
elections 
 
Created a $1000 
individual per 
election contribution 
limit and a $5000 
PAC limit.  
 
Abolished limits on 
media advertising  
 
Created the Federal 
Election 
Commission.   
Major 
Provisions were 
declared to be 
unconstitutional 
by the Supreme 
Court 
 
Money rerouted 
from the same 
sources into 
PACs resulting 
in an explosion 
of the number 
of PACs  
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued) 
Important Events Year Importance Loopholes 
Buckley v. Valeo 
Supreme Court Decision 
1976 Upheld disclosure 
requirements, limits 
on individual 
contributions, 
voluntary public 
financing, and the 
President’s authority 
to appoint 
commissioners to the 
Federal Election 
Commission as 
constitutional.  
 
Ruled that limits on 
candidate 
expenditures are 
unconstitutional 
unless the candidate 
accepts public 
financing  
 
Unconstitutional to 
place limits on 
personal and 
“independent” 
expenditures.  
 
 
Amendments to the 1974 
Federal Campaign  
1976 Brought the law in 
line with the Supreme 
Court decision. 
 
Limited individual 
contributions to 
national parties to 
$20,000 per year, and 
individual 
contributions to 
PACs to $5000 per 
year. 
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Table 2.5. Important Events in the History of Campaign Finance (Continued) 
Important Events Year Importance Loopholes 
Amendments to the 1974 
Federal Campaign 
1979 Increased the in-kind 
contributions from 
$500 to $1000 
 
Raised the threshold 
for reporting 
contributions from 
$100 to $200 
 
Prohibited the FEC 
from performing 
random audits 
 
Allowed state and 
local parties to spend 
unlimited amounts on 
campaign materials 
used by volunteers 
and on voter 
registration and get-
out-the-vote 
campaigns. 
Soft Money 
Loophole 
Bipartisan Campaign 
Finance Reform Act 
2002 Ban on Soft Money  
 
Increases individual 
contribution amounts 
to $2,000 per election 
and to the national 
party committees to 
$25,000.  
 
Attempts to control 
the timing of ads 
from independent 
groups for federal 
office.  
527 Loophole 
McConnell, United States 
Senator, Et Al. v. Federal 
Election Commission Et 
Al. (Supreme Court 
Case) 
2003 Upheld Most 
Provisions of the 
2002 Bipartisan 
Campaign Finance 
Reform Act 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
 
 In this dissertation, I attempt to address three important questions that are derived out 
of gaps in the existing literature. First, what motivates contributors to give campaign 
contributions to state legislators? Second, what is the impact of legal restrictions on the 
pattern of campaign contributions, and, in particular, what is the impact of session limits on 
the strategies employed by political action committees? Finally, I provide some suggestions 
on reforms that may provide the best opportunity to remove the undue influence of money 
and corruption from the political system.   
The campaign finance literature is vast and examines a number of important issues. 
However, the impact of campaign finance laws is a common thread that bounds all the 
literature together. Campaign finance laws are at the center of all decisions made by 
contributors and recipients of contributions and have to be considered no matter what the 
specific question under consideration may be.  Spending limits are an important factor to 
consider when examining the affects of spending on electoral outcomes. Additionally, limits 
on the amount and timing of contribution have to be considered when attempting to 
understand not only electoral outcomes but legislative outcomes as well.  
The key focus of this dissertation is to understand the motivations and actions of 
contributors, however, it is also important to understand the impact of those motivations in 
order to provide insight into the direction of future campaign finance reforms. As indicated 
in chapter two there have been many efforts to implement the campaign finance system, 
however, most of these efforts have been unsuccessful at increasing public trust of 
government. In addition to an overview of the literature on the motivations of contributors, 
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this chapter also examines the literature on the impact of universalistic and particularistic 
contributions.  
 The first two sections in this chapter provide an overview of the factors that explain 
campaign spending and the effects of spending on electoral outcomes. The first section 
examines the effects of institutional and legal differences on campaign spending patterns. 
The second section examines the effect of spending on electoral outcomes. The first two 
sections show if a link exists between spending and electoral outcomes. If there is no link 
between spending and electoral outcomes then we would expect most contributors would be 
particularistic contributors, who are attempting to influence the outcome of a legislative 
vote, instead of universalistic contributors, whose contribution is a waste of resources since 
it has no bearing on the election outcome.  It is extremely important to have an 
understanding of the effects of spending on electoral outcomes if we want to understand the 
motives of contributors. In the third section, I examine the literature on why contributors 
give money and to whom it is given. This section is closely related to the first two sections 
in that patterns of campaign contributions may influence election outcomes. An 
understanding of the literature in both sections is critical to understanding what motivates 
contributors. If spending has no affect on electoral outcomes, it is very unlikely interest 
groups would be giving contributions in hopes of affecting an election outcome unless they 
miscalculate the importance of their contribution. However, interest groups are unlikely to 
miscalculate the importance of a contribution as they become very skilled at how the system 
works to achieve the desired outcome. Nevertheless, if spending does affect election 
outcomes then interest groups may be motivated by election outcomes and/or legislative 
outcomes.  
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 The final question in this chapter examines the literature that addresses questions 
concerned with the impact of campaign contributions on the behavior of legislators. This 
final set of literature represents the last and perhaps the most important stage in 
understanding the impact of campaign contributions. If campaign contributions do not affect 
the action of recipients, then reform efforts are much less important. Consistent with the 
previous questions, the importance of campaign finance laws is critical in understanding the 
behavior of legislators. Legislators are keenly aware of restrictions placed on their actions, 
and how well those restrictions are enforced. The primary goal of most legislators is their 
desire to be re-elected, which drives many of their decisions.  Legislators need money for 
their re-election campaigns, but also have to consider the ramifications of failing to follow 
legal restrictions on campaign contributions.  
 
1. Factors that affect spending 
Many different factors have been identified to explain candidate-spending levels. 
The states provide an excellent opportunity to study the effects of different institutional 
structural patterns on candidate spending, however, the lack of available data has limited the 
amount of state level research conducted. Hogan and Hamm (1998) found the population 
size of a district was the most important factor in predicting a candidate’s spending level. 
Additionally, they found spending was higher in states with restrictive campaign finance 
laws, more professional legislatures, and where party control of the legislature was in doubt. 
Moncrief and Patton (1993) and Stonecash (1990) also found spending was higher when 
partisan control of the legislature was not certain. Likewise, Moncrief and Thompson (1998) 
found spending was higher in Idaho and Stonecash (1990) found it was higher in New York 
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when control of the legislature is uncertain. These findings indicate higher spending is 
consistent across legislatures of different professional levels when control of the legislature 
is uncertain.   
State legislative research has not been confined to general elections; it has also 
examined spending in primary elections. Breaux and Gierzynski (1998) found incumbents 
spend more than challengers and open-seat candidates in primary elections. Additionally, 
primary expenditures were found to be higher in professional states. Hogan (1999) extended 
the previous research and found the district population size and the number of primary 
opponents affects spending.  Hogan’s results were in conflict with previous findings that 
indicate greater spending levels occur in states that are more professional.  He found that in 
these states the majority of money from interest groups and political parties was saved for 
the general election and not used during the primaries.  
The findings of Hogan and Hamm (1998) are opposite of what we expect to find and 
provide some evidence that legal restrictions have not been successful at decreasing 
spending in elections. However, the relationship between spending and legal restrictions is 
still not fully understood (Gross and Goidel 2004).  Moreover, as noted by Gross and Goidel 
(2004), the impact of campaign finance regulations is dependent upon the nature of the 
regulation in place. Campaign finance regulations tend to exert their biggest effect on 
incumbent spending, however, this does not translate into a greater share of the vote for the 
incumbent and therefore has little impact on the outcome of the election (Gross and Goidel 
2004).  Additional research needs to examine how spending patterns change when faced 
with various legal restrictions. Furthermore, the increased level of spending in campaigns 
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has only served to further dissolution the public and their perceptions of interest groups 
possessing to much influence on a corrupt political system. 
 
2. Effects of spending upon electoral developments 
The literature on electoral developments addresses reform efforts to make elections 
more competitive. Making elections more competitive is one of the primary motivations of 
campaign finance reform, thus making the United States more democratic by giving the 
voters more choices and increasing involvement by citizens in the political process. 
Additionally, competitive elections result in citizens that believe that their vote matters and 
they can have a voice in a political system perceived as non-responsive to the average 
citizen. In the United States, most elections are non-competitive with the incumbent easily 
winning re-election. Non-competitive elections pose a potential problem for a democratic 
society since voters have no real choice. One motivation for the implementation of 
campaign finance laws and reforms to existing campaign finance laws is to increase 
electoral competition that in turn results in a system seen as more legitimate by citizens.    
 
2.1. Outcomes 
A number of scholars have examined the affects of spending on electoral developments.  
More specifically, the relationship between spending, electoral competition, and whether 
spending results in more competitive elections is a key question addressed in the literature. 
Additionally, the link between money spent and the knowledge of the electorate is an 
important question. Finally, it is important to understand if spending translates into higher 
turnout at the polls. Spending may make elections more competitive and the electorate more 
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informed, however, that does not necessarily mean that more voters will show up at the 
polls. Turnout is one factor that serves an indicator of public trust of the political system. If 
voters see the system as corrupt and responsive only to the special interest then they may see 
their vote as useless in affecting policy outcomes, therefore increased voter turnout is a sign 
of a system the people believe they can change and that their vote can make a difference. 
Many explanations attempt to explain why incumbents are so successful in winning 
reelection. Central to this literature are the effects of campaign finance law and reform 
efforts on the outcome of an election. If we hope to offer policy recommendations 
concerning future campaign finance reforms, it is important that we understand the impact 
of reforms on electoral outcomes. 
While the key focus of this paper is the impact of campaign finance laws on the 
actions of interest groups in trying to influence policy outcomes, it is important to recognize 
that campaign finance laws do not operate in isolation. Laws that may affect electoral 
outcomes in a positive way may have an adverse affect in the policy arena. In offering 
policy recommendations, it is critical that we understand the full ramifications of any policy 
we are choosing to implement so we are not surprised by the outcomes. While fully 
understanding the impact of every reform is not always possible, we should strive for the 
best understanding of the potential ramifications of every reform before it is enacted. 
Furthermore, ineffective reform efforts not only fail to solve the problem they were intended 
to solve, but may also serve to further solidified the belief among the public that corruption 
is a part of the political system, and that is unlikely to change any time in the future.  
Jacobson has conducted the seminal works in campaign finance of the effects of 
spending on election outcomes.  Jacobson (1978, 1980, 1985, 1990) and Abramowitz (1988, 
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1991) argue that incumbents receive little benefit from campaign expenditures since they are 
already well known by the voters. This evidence suggests that campaign contribution limits 
would hurt challengers with little name recognition. Glantz, Abramowitz, and Burkart 
(1976) found similar findings for the California State Assembly, and the differences in the 
effects of incumbent and challenger spending were confirmed by Olson (1983) in Texas 
state legislative elections and Giles and Pritchard (1985) in Florida as well as other scholars 
such as Caldeira and Patterson (1982), Tucker and Weber (1987) and multiple state studies 
by Gierzynski and Breaux (1991) and Cassie and Breaux (1998). These findings are 
generally explained by the suggestion that incumbents are most likely to spend money when 
they are most threatened in their re-election bids, thus providing an explanation for the 
difference in the impact of incumbent and challenger spending. Additionally, with the 
incumbent usually enjoying a huge advantage when it comes to name recognition, the 
challenger often needs a lot more money than the incumbent does in order to be successful 
in winning the election. However, other scholars have not found the same differences in the 
impact of incumbent and challenger spending (Green and Kranso 1988; Goidel and Gross 
1994). However, even if campaign contributions limits are unsuccessful at causing more 
incumbents to be defeated, they may have a different affect on legislative decisions and 
these differing affects need to be weighed against one another in offering reform proposals.  
 
2.1. Competition 
Increasing competition in elections have been at the center of many campaign 
finance reform proposals. However, legal restrictions have not always been successful at 
achieving their intended objectives and in some cases may have resulted in elections that 
  
 
 
51 
were even less competitive. The lack of competitiveness of elections in turn results in some 
citizens feeling they have little say in government, as the outcome of most elections seems 
to be predetermined. In turn, citizens that feel they have little say in who is elected also feel 
that their voice is not heard in the legislative process. 
Evidence of the importance of spending on the vote share in federal elections is 
clearly mixed. These findings are also consistent with studies of state level elections. 
Jacobson’s (1978) argument that incumbent spending did not affect the vote was supported 
at the state level by Welch (1976). Additionally, Tucker and Weber (1987) conclude that 
party strength is more important than candidate spending in determining vote share. 
However, Owens and Olson (1977), in their study of California legislative elections, 
conclude that spending is the best predictor of the vote, and incumbency and party strength 
were only of secondary importance. Caldeira and Patterson (1982) confirmed these findings 
in California and Iowa, thus providing evidence that the previous findings were not 
exclusive to California. However, these studies still suffer from a lack of generalizability 
which Gierzynski and Breaux (1993) attempt to address through an examination of twelve 
states. They conclude that partisan influences on a candidate’s vote share were stronger in 
some states than in others and that contributions were more important in those states with 
weak partisan influences. 
Adamany (1969) was among the first to address the question of spending levels in 
state elections through his examination of elections in Wisconsin. While he found that 
spending levels in dollar terms was not very high, his primary concern was spending 
inequality among candidates. He found that many potential candidates could not raise the 
money to be able to compete effectively. The lack of competitiveness in elections results in 
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citizens feeling they have little say in government controlled by candidates with money from 
special interest. Other scholars such as Neal (1992), Hogan (1999), and Breaux and 
Gierzynski (1998) also suggest these concerns.  The difference between incumbent and 
challenger spending has been the catalyst for many calls for campaign finance reform to 
level the playing field between incumbents and challengers. This inequality in spending 
among candidates has been the incentive for caps on the amount of money that candidates 
can spend in elections. However, soft money and other loopholes often allow candidates to 
get around these requirements. These loopholes serve to increase the perception of 
corruption among the political and thus provide evidence of the need to refine existing law 
to remove corruption and the perception of corruption from the political system.  
Other scholars argue that incumbent expenditures are important when the quality of 
the challenger is considered in the equation (Green and Kranso 1988, 1990: Goidel, Gross 
and Shield 1999; Goidel and Gross 1994; Thomas 1989; Erikson and Palfrey 1998, 2000; 
Gerber 1998). As such, these scholars argue that contribution limits may actually increase 
competition and that equal spending levels may increase challenger success. Campaign 
spending by challengers has a positive effect on challenger vote share, and incumbent 
spending has a positive, although smaller, impact on incumbent vote shares (Grier 1989; 
Green and Krasno 1988; Levitt 1984).  Finally, contribution limits do not affect just 
electoral competition but also impact voter turnout, the number of candidates, and partisan 
competition (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; Hogan 2000; Gross, Shields 
and Goidel 2002; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castilli 2001). 
The affects of spending on electoral competition are not fully established in the 
literature. These findings have interesting implications for the study of the motivations of 
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interest groups. If spending has an impact on electoral competition, then political action 
committees may be motivated by trying to influence the outcome of the election. On the 
other hand, if spending does not affect competition then there is little incentive for 
contributors to give with the hope of influencing the outcome of the election, and they are 
likely providing contributions for other motivations such as influencing legislative 
outcomes. 
 The impact of contribution limits on spending is not understood completely in the 
literature. Campaign contribution limits are often enacted with the hope of decreasing 
spending in elections. However, limits often do not achieve their intended effect. A decrease 
in contribution limits may be offset by an increase in the number of contributors giving to 
the campaign. Changes in contribution limits do not necessarily result in less spending, but 
in the acquisition of donations from a broader spectrum of sources. However, while 
spending in elections may not decrease as the result of contribution limits increasing the 
number of contributors necessary to raise the money necessary to run a campaign is 
important as it decreases corruption and the perception of corruption by involving more 
contributors in the process. The more contributors that are involved in the process the lower 
the perception of one individual contributor being able to gain undue influence over the 
policy making process.  
Campaign contributions limits have been enacted to increase electoral 
competitiveness (Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; Hogan 2000; Gross, Shields 
and Goidel 2002; Stratmann and Aparicio-Castilli 2001). However, they have not always 
achieved their desired goals. Some scholars have found a positive relationship between 
limits and competition (Krasno and Green 1993; Green and Krasno 1988, 1990) while others 
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have found a negative relationship (Jacobson 1980; Sorauf 1992; Alexander 1992; Teixeira 
1996).   
Additionally, even if contribution limits exist, spending in campaigns will increase if 
a highly qualified challenger enters the race, thus making the election more competitive 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; Hogan 2000; Gross, Shields, and Goidel 
2002). Hogan (2000), through an examination of a variety of context for various candidate 
and state-level factors, concludes that campaign contribution limits have been effective in 
reducing spending.  However, he notes that limits would have been more successful if 
interest groups had not found alternative ways of funneling money to candidates. These 
findings are in contrast to other scholars that have noted contribution limits do not 
necessarily reduce overall spending. Gross, Shield and Goidel (2002) find contributions 
limits do not limit total spending and actually increase spending among incumbents and 
Democrats in states with more restrictive limits.  
The impact of contribution limits is varied and the affects are not always completely 
understood. First, contribution limits negatively affect the incumbent’s future share of the 
vote. However, incumbents responsible for passage of contribution limits do not suffer at the 
polls (Stratmann). Second, campaign contribution limits lessen the difference in candidate 
spending (Hogan 2000). Third, limits affect the distribution of contributions among 
candidates and the frequency of contributions, however, this relationship is not completely 
understood (Aranson and Hinich 1979; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Dow 1994; 
Hinich 1977; Welch 1974). The impact of campaign finance laws is not always clear and 
may result in unintended consequences, and therefore caution must be exercise before 
passing any legislation. For example, contribution limits may restructure how donations are 
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collected, but do not necessarily result in less spending. The passage of a contribution limit 
may result in a greater number of contributors to the candidate, but placing limits on 
contributors does not necessarily result in less spending by the candidate during the election. 
Furthermore, the enactment of unsuccessful legislation has been ineffective in restoring 
public trust in political leaders. 
 
2.3.Knowledge and Interest 
Campaign spending is an issue of importance, as it influences the quality of 
democracy of the United States. A key aspect of an effective democracy is an informed 
electorate. As with the previous questions we examined, an understanding of campaign 
finance laws is central to understanding how citizens receive their information and is at the 
center of how the electorate is informed. An effort to limit the role of independent 
expenditures and issue advocacy ads and when these can be used affects the way the 
electorate is informed. Coleman and Manna (2000) examine U.S. House elections from 1994 
to 1996 and conclude that spending results in better-informed citizens and does not damage 
public trust or involvement one-third of the time. They conclude that spending has positive 
affects on democracy through increased public understanding of the candidates and the 
issues. These findings are in contrast, however, to other scholars who find that spending 
does not necessarily result in a better-informed electorate (Goidel, Gross, Shields 1999). 
Additionally, Franklin (1991) concludes it may be more in the interest of the challenger than 
the incumbent to confuse voters about the incumbent. This finding reveals that greater 
spending results in a less accurate portrayal of the incumbent and therefore this is not good 
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for democracy.  Confusion among voters often results in an electorate that feels 
unrepresentative in government and in turn often chooses not to vote. 
 
2.4. Turnout 
Voter turnout tends to be low in the United States. The lack of participation by has 
resulted in efforts to get out the vote and encourage citizens to vote. Low voter turnout is 
especially evident in primary, midterm and local races. In most cases, less money is spent on 
these elections making them lower profile. Combined with the lower levels of candidate 
spending, and less media coverage these races result in lower levels of voter turnout. The 
literature on the link between spending and voter turnout generally finds a positive 
relationship. Jacobson (1978, 1980), and Caldeira and Patterson (1982) find that increases in 
spending result in higher levels of voter turnout. Furthermore, Dawson and Zinser (1976) 
find that turnout in congressional races increases 1 to 2 percent for every $1000 increase in 
expenditures, and Conway (1981) finds a significant relationship between turnout and the 
spending level of congressional Democratic candidates in midterm elections in the 1970s. 
Conversely, Kenney and Rice (1985) argue that under the current presidential primary 
system spending is not likely to have a significant impact on voter turnout during primaries. 
However, spending may affect turnout under a different primary structure. The link between 
spending and turnout results in a dilemma for reformers. Voter participation is touted as a 
positive, however, high-spending levels may be a negative for a democracy since 
challengers can rarely match the spending of incumbents. Furthermore, high-spending levels 
increase the need for contributions, and the influence of PACs in the political process.  The 
increase in the influence of PACs in the political system creates cynicism among the public 
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and raises the question of the need to reform the existing system to diminish the undue 
influence of contributors in the political system. 
 
3. Literature on Contributors  
 Campaign contributions are provided to candidates running for office by a variety of 
different sources. Individuals, interest groups, political action committees, businesses, 
corporations, and political parties all provide contributions to candidates running for office. 
The motivation and strategies employed by contributors are key questions addressed within 
the literature as well as in this dissertation. As with all the literature, an understanding of 
legal environment in which contributors operate is critical to fully understanding the 
strategies employed by contributors. 
  
3.1. Why do contributors give money? 
One of the most important questions addressed in the literature is why campaign 
contributions are given to certain candidates. Some interest groups employ an electoral 
strategy while others give contributions in order to gain access to elective officials (Jacobson 
and Kernell 1982; Eismeier and Pollock 1985; Langbein 1986; Wright 1989). Additionally, 
research reveals two major reasons for campaign donations: influencing policy and affecting 
electoral outcomes. One set of research findings suggests that contributions are given with 
the hope of influencing public policy (Ben-Zion and Eyton 1974; Bental and Ben-Zion 
1975; Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Kau and Rubin 1982). Additional research has 
progressed beyond prediction toward a quantitative assessment of the relationship between 
contributions and votes. 
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 Particularistic contributors attempt to influence policy for their personal benefit 
(Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; 
Cox and Munger 1999; Chappell 1982; Jones and Hopkins 1985; Hendrie, Salant and 
Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990; 
Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). On the other hand, universalistic contributors 
donate money with the hope of affecting election outcomes (Fuchs, Adler and Mitchell 
2000; Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Morton and Cameron 1992; Mueller 1989; Mutz 
1995; McAdams and Green 2000; Poole and Romer 1985; Sabato 1985; Snyder 1990; 
Welch 1974 and 1980). Universalistic contributors’ efforts benefit a much broader segment 
of the population since all supporters of the candidate benefit through their efforts to elect 
them to office.   
Particularistic contributors can further be divided into two subsets. Quid pro quo 
contributors give with the hope of receiving a positive legislative vote in return for their 
contribution. On the other hand, some particularistic contributors provide contributions as 
insurance to keep legislators in office who support their position. Quid pro quo contributors 
are of a greater concern to reformers desiring to limit the undue influence of money in 
politics, since they are attempting change a legislator’s vote in exchange for a campaign 
contribution. One set of research has argued that contributors are not trying to “buy votes,” 
but instead want to increase the probability that unfavorable legislation will not be enacted 
by giving to those that are already likely to support their position (Aranson and Hinich 1979; 
Hinich 1977).  Conversely, other studies have found that contributions are an attempt to 
influence legislation outcomes (Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; Box-
Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox and Munger 1999; Jones and Hopkins 1985; Hendrie, 
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Salant and Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and Cameron 1992; Snyder 
1990; Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). As discussed previously, the bulk of 
campaign contributions are given to incumbent candidates who have high re-election rates; 
therefore, it is reasonable to assume that contributors are hoping to achieve something 
beyond just the election of a particular candidate. Understanding the strategies and motives 
of contributors allows us to better reform the system to remove corruption from the system. 
 
3.2. Who gets money and whom does it benefit? 
 
A basic question addressed in the literature on interest group contributions is who 
receives contributions.  Jones and Borris (1985) were the first to conclude that in state 
legislative elections PACs tend to give money to gain influence with legislators instead of 
attempting to target close legislative races. The literature discusses six factors in explaining 
who receives interest group contributions-incumbent status (Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie 
and Thompson 1998), constituency interests (Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Denzau and 
Munger 1985; Stratmann 1992), committee membership (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier 
and Munger 1991; Welch 1974), leadership position (Thielemann and Dixon 1994), 
candidate gender (Thompson, Moncrief, and Hamm (1998) and closeness of the election 
(Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982).  
The literature on campaign contributions has found that contributors tend to give 
more money to incumbent candidates (Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie and Thompson 1998).  
Interest groups desiring to influence policy outcomes target their contributions to those most 
likely to hold office and be in a position to impact legislative outputs, therefore with high 
incumbent re-election rates it reasons that incumbents would receive the majority of 
contributions in a system driven by particularistic contributors. On the other hand, 
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universalistic contributors would target their resources to vulnerable incumbents and 
challengers in competitive races. What may seem like a contribution to influence an election 
outcome may in fact be an attempt to gain undue influence of an elective official in office.   
In contrast to interest groups, parties give more money to challengers (Jones and 
Borris 1985; Stonecash 1998, 1990; Thompson and Cassie 1992; Gierzynski and Breaux 
1994, 1998; Malbin and Gais 1998; Thompson, Cassie, and Jewell 1994; Cassie and 
Thompson 1998). Schecter and Hedge (2001) found that in Florida political parties are 
especially more likely to give money to challengers in competitive races. The difference in 
the targeting of contributions by interest groups and parties indicates that political parties are 
more interested in maximizing the number of seats in the legislature while interest groups 
are interested in gaining influence with office holders. 
The interests of the constituency (Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982; Denzau and 
Munger 1985; Stratmann 1992) play a role in campaign donations. Denzau and Munger 
(1985) use a constrained maximization model in which three agents have preferences over 
policy outcomes. Interest groups contribute in order to improve their own wealth, voters 
provide votes to obtain outcomes closer to their desired position, and legislators seek both 
campaign contributions and votes in order to obtain re-election. In this model, legislators are 
constantly weighing their options between the concerns of the constituents and the money 
provided by interest group contributions. The difficult decision on casting a legislative vote 
arises when the preferences of the contributor are not in agreement with the preferences of 
the constituents. 
  Additionally, money is most likely to be contributed to candidates in close races 
(Kau, Keenan, and Rubin 1982) and those that serve on committees of importance to the 
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concerns of the contributor (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and Munger 1991; Welch 
1974). When the outcome of an election is close, contributors often sense the opportunity to 
affect their position in the legislature by defeating an unfavorable incumbent or they fear the 
defeat of a member supportive of their position. Furthermore, in a close election the winner 
may feel an increased sense of obligation to contributors who may help pull him or her over 
the top to win the election. Campaign contributions are a limited resource. Contributors have 
to exercise care in maximizing the benefits received from their donations. It is very difficult 
for challengers to overcome the advantages held by incumbents, therefore it is often a poor 
allocation of resources to pour money into a challenger’s campaign that is likely to be 
defeated. Hence, in states with strong committee systems, committees are often able to kill 
legislation independent of the desires of the full chamber, hence an interest group has the 
possibility of killing legislation prior to consideration by the committee of the whole. Other 
members of the legislature that are not as knowledgeable in an area often defer to the 
committee, accordingly the committee is in the best position to shape legislation in favor of 
the interest groups position. 
Thielemann and Dixon (1994) found that contributors are motivated by a candidate’s 
place in the legislative leadership. Those in position of leadership receive more contributions 
than rank and file members. Additionally, women were found to receive fewer contributions 
in highly professional legislatures than men (Thompson, Moncrief, and Hamm 1998). This 
may be the product of the dominance of parties, PACs, and interest groups in these states, 
resulting in women still seen as outsiders and not as viable candidates. Hogan and 
Thompson (1998) found that minority candidates did not receive as much money as white 
  
 
 
62 
candidates, but differences in the gender and racial gaps in fundraising were not that great 
and the gaps may further diminish as more minorities and women gain leadership status. 
In addition to examining the direct effects of spending on vote shares, a few studies 
have addressed the question of how laws affect a candidate’s ability to raise money.  For the 
most part, these studies have been confined to the effects of spending (Abramowitz 1991; 
Goidel and Gross 1994, 1996; Goidel, Gross and Shield 1999; Green and Krasno 1988; 
Gross, Goidel, and Shields 1997; Jacobson 1980) and the sources of fundraising (Sorauf 
1988, 1992) at the national level.  Sorauf (1992) finds that incumbents learn to exploit the 
PAC system to raise large sums of money that far exceed challengers. Incumbents therefore 
are able to build “war chests” to deter challengers from running against them (Box-
Steffensmeier 1996). The large amounts of money at the disposal of incumbents in turn 
serve to alienate the public from the political system. Additionally, Abramowitz (1991) 
concludes that the decrease in electoral competition can be contributed to a decrease in a 
challenger’s ability to raise money. The enactment of campaign finance laws to reduce 
spending in elections has resulted in the unintended consequence of inhibiting challengers’ 
ability to raise money, thereby decreasing their success since challengers have a greater need 
for money than incumbents to get their message out to the public.  
Studies of state campaign contributions provide an opportunity to study a broader 
array of regulatory context. Many studies, have been limited to one or only a few states 
(Donnay and Ramsden 1995; Mayer and Wood 1995; Redfield 1996) or even single state 
studies (Kettl et al, 1997; Redfield 1995, 2000). However, some scholars have attempted 
comprehensive studies of campaign finance systems (Malbin and Gais 1998; Mayer 1997; 
Thompson and Moncrief 1998). The few studies conducted at the state level have found that 
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PAC money goes mostly to incumbents (Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie and Thompson 
1998) and that parties give more to challengers than other types of contributors (Malbin and 
Gais 1998; Gierynski and Breaux 1998).   
 
 
4. Contributions and legislative behavior. 
 
 The timing of campaign contributions is an important question in the campaign 
finance literature, as this research provides not only insight into the motivation of 
contributors, but also the action of recipients in response to receiving a donation. An 
important question debated in this literature is the impact of campaign contributions on 
legislators’ issue positions. The key question addressed in this literature is how often a 
contribution results in a change in the vote that would have been cast if the contribution had 
not been received. Many scholars have found a strong correlation between contributions and 
votes on legislation (Silberman and Durden 1976; Chappell 1981, 1982; Kau Keenan and 
Rubin 1982; Welch 1982, Fendreis and Waterman 1985; Grier and Munger 1986; Hall and 
Wayman 1990; Endersby and Munger 1992; Stratmann 1991, 1995; Kroszner and Strahan 
2000). However, many of these studies suffer from a simultaneous equation bias, in that if 
interest groups contribute to legislators who support them anyway, the impact of 
contributions on vote decisions would be overestimated.  It is extremely difficult to isolate 
the impact of campaign contributions on legislative votes, since often a legislator would 
have voted the same without the contribution.   
Stratmann (2000) attempts to overcome the simultaneous equation bias problem, that 
exists in examining the relationship between contributions and legislative votes, by 
examining the behavior of legislators at different points in time. Stratmann (1992, 2000) 
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provides only a couple of studies that quantitatively examine the behavior of recipients of 
campaign contributions. He examines roll call votes on price supports and quotas for various 
farm commodities in 1981 and 1985 (Stratmann 1992). The results show that without 
campaign contributions, farm interest would have lost seven out of ten votes. Additionally, 
campaign contributions given at the time of a vote had a greater impact on voting behavior 
than those given one or two years prior to a vote. Stratmann (2000) examines financial 
services legislation and finds results similar to his previous work. Changes in contribution 
levels determine changes in roll call voting behavior. Additionally, contributions from 
competing groups are partially offsetting and senior members are less responsive to changes 
in contribution levels than junior legislators.  
Stratmann (1998) studies the timing of campaign contributions to determine the 
objective of PACs. He includes three variables in his model to explain weekly contributions. 
The vote event is the first variable included in his study. The variable is coded as one for the 
two weeks during which votes on the farm bill occurred as well as one for the three weeks 
before, and after the vote weeks with all other weeks coded as zero. The second variable 
included in the model is the general election that equals one for each week in the months of 
September and October and zero for all other weeks. The third variable included in the 
model is the primary variable that equals one for each week from the end of February to mid 
May. He estimates his model of campaign contributions using a Poisson regression, and his 
results reveal that PACs are attempting to influencing congressional votes as well as 
elections. Contributions increase in the weeks surrounding important legislative votes as 
well as the election. In 1985 the number and amount of contributions surrounding the Farm 
Bill vote was significantly higher than the primary but was not as great as the general 
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election. He concludes by stating that PACs use contributions as a mechanism to keep 
legislators from reneging on quid pro quo agreements.  
It is extremely difficult to access the impact of contributions on the behavior of 
legislators and whether those contributions result in undue influence of the contributor. 
Stratmann’s (1998) model serves as the basis for this research. While the model does not 
allow us to determine the impact of contributions, it does serve the important purpose of 
providing insight into the behavior of contributors. Our knowledge of interest group 
influence in the legislative process is limited almost exclusively to the federal level, and 
even that literature is not fully developed to the point where we can make broad 
generalizations of the influence of contributions on the behavior of legislators. Expanding 
the current literature to the state level will allow us to make some inroads to understanding 
the impact of contributions across various legal and institutional differences. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have attempted to provide an overview of the campaign finance 
literature. Through out this entire literate we see a common theme. Many different efforts 
have been put forth in order to remove the undue influence of money from the political 
system. However, despite all of these efforts public mistrust of government survives. These 
reform efforts have often failed because interest groups recognize loopholes within those 
laws and change their strategies to reflect the new environment in which they operate.  
In the first section, I examined factors that affect spending, which is structured by a 
variety of factors including electoral conditions, institutional structures and legal 
restrictions. In the second section, I examined the affects of spending on electoral outcomes. 
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In the third section, I examined the motivations of contributors and whom they target in 
providing contributions. Finally, I examined the impact of contributions on legislative 
behavior. Three key points emerge from an examination of the literature. First, campaign 
finance regulations have to be placed at the center of our research in order to understand 
what the impact of money is on electoral or legislative outcomes. Political action 
committees operate in a maze of laws and regulations that dictate their behavior, and failure 
to include these factors will result in an incomplete understanding of the role of money in 
the political process. Second, the majority of the existing literature is at the federal level 
with our knowledge of campaign finance at the state level much more limited. The states 
provide us with many potential opportunities for research since they operate under a variety 
of different legal systems. This variation is not present at the national level, thus conducting 
more state level research is critical to understanding the impact of campaign finance laws. 
The state level examination places us in a position to provide more sound policy 
recommendations as to the direction reform should take to remove undue influence from the 
legislative process and to make elections more competitive. Finally, while many questions 
have been answered in the literature, many questions remain. Whom the recipients of 
campaign contributions are is well established in the literature. Incumbents and those in the 
best position to influence policy outcomes are the most likely to receive campaign 
contributions, however, the impact of money on legislative and electoral outcomes is mixed.  
There have been many advances in our understanding of the role of money in the political 
process, however, much is still unclear. This dissertation will bridge some of these gaps in 
the existing literature by providing a greater understanding of why contributors give money 
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in state legislative elections and how they respond when confronted with legal restrictions 
on their actions. 
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Chapter 4: Theory and Hypotheses 
 
 In chapter three, I discussed two main motivations for campaign contributors. First, 
universalistic contributions are given with the hope of influencing election outcomes (Fuchs, 
Adler and Mitchell 2000; Magee, Brock and Young 1989; Morton and Cameron 1992; 
Mueller 1989; Mutz 1995; McAdams and Green 2000; Poole and Romer 1985; Sabato 1985; 
Snyder 1990; Welch 1974 and 1980). Second, particularistic contributions are given with the 
desire to influence legislative votes (Austen-Smith 1995, 1998; Ben-Zion and Eytan 1974; 
Box-Steffensmeier and Dow 1992; Cox and Munger 1999; Chappell 1982; Jones and 
Hopkins 1985; Hendrie, Salant and Makinson 2000; McAdams and Green 2000; Morton and 
Cameron 1992; Snyder 1990; Strattmann 1998; Welch 1977 and 1980). This dissertation 
attempts to determine if PACs are attempting to influence the outcome of legislative votes. 
Additionally, this dissertation attempts to determine what strategies PACs employed when 
faced with prohibitions on contributions during the legislative session. It is expected that the 
election will be the main factor in explaining campaign contributions. It is also expected that 
a portion of contributors given two months prior to the election are particularistic 
contributors attempting to ensure the election of a candidate most sympathetic to their cause. 
Furthermore, some particularistic contributors appear to be universalistic contributors due to 
legal restrictions, such as session limits, that force them to provide contributions at a time 
different from the legislative session.  
 Particularistic contributions are theorized to be more effective at the state level than 
at the national level for several reasons. First, state legislation tends to be less salient with 
citizens than national legislation. Most news coverage is focused at the national level with 
less attention paid to state legislation, thereby limiting the information the public receives 
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concerning state politics. This lack of attention to state issues by the media results in a less 
informed public. Because of the lack of news coverage, the public is less aware of what is 
going on in their state governments, which allows the recipients of contributions to change 
their position without fear of electoral consequences. Additionally, state legislatures tend to 
be less professional then the United States Congress. Hence, electoral concerns may not be 
as great in amateur legislators, thus decreasing the risk for changing one’s vote based on a 
contribution. Squire’s (1992) measure of professionalism uses Congress as the base line for 
a professional legislature, and the index he formulates attempts to determine how closely 
state legislatures resemble Congress. He finds that New York has the most professional state 
legislature, however, it is still not as professionalized as the United States Congress.   
Schlesinger (1966) notes that political ambition varies from one state to the next based upon 
the opportunity structure in that state. In professional states, there are more opportunities for 
those with political ambitions to advance in their careers, therefore electoral concerns are 
more important to legislators in those states. Conversely, in states without the opportunity 
for advancement, electoral concerns are not as great.  Rhyme (2000) shows that state 
legislatures have a high rate of turnover, with most legislative leaders staying in their 
positions for five years or less. Additionally, eighteen states have term limits8, thereby 
forcing members to retire resulting in significant turnover in the future (Rhyme 2000). The 
high turnover in state legislatures, along with the increased enactment of term limits, results 
in legislators being less concerned with re-election, which results in less need for campaign 
donations. Furthermore, term limits may decrease contributions given as a reward after a 
                                                 
8
 California is the only state included in this study that has term limits for state legislators. Members of the 
state senate are limited to two terms for a total of eight years and members of the Assembly are limited to 3 
terms for a total of 6 years. It is unlikely that term limits have an affect on interest group activities in California 
due to the fact that most members, upon being term limited out of office, chose to run for a different office and 
thereby it is in the interest of the contributor to want to continue a positive relationship with the legislator.  
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positive vote given the fact that the contributor may not need to establish a long-term 
relationship with the legislator.   
 
1. Contributions and Critical Time Points  
 There are seven key points during the course of the election and legislative process. 
Interest groups have to decide if they are going to contribute at each of these key points. 
Particularistic and universalistic contributors are likely to make different evaluations as to 
whether to contribute at each one of these time periods. 
 The primary is the first critical time point in which contributors have to decide if 
they are going to contribute. The decision to contribute prior to the primary involves several 
considerations. First, contributors must determine their preferred candidate. Second, 
contributors must determine the likelihood their preferred candidate will win. Finally, 
contributors must evaluate the closeness of the election for their preferred candidate. 
The general election is the second critical time point in which contributors have to 
decide if they are going to contribute. The decision to give prior to the general election 
involves the same considerations for the primary. First, who is the preferred candidate, 
second what is the likelihood their preferred candidate will win and by what margin. 
Contributors are more likely to give to a candidate expected to win or that has a 
realistic chance at winning, therefore, incumbents receive the majority of contributions 
(Malbin and Gais 1998; Cassie and Thompson 1998). Challengers are most likely to receive 
contributions when they are facing a vulnerable incumbent, as is the case when the 
incumbent may be involved in a scandal. Ethical problems do not always result in the defeat 
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of the incumbent, but they are more likely to be defeated under these circumstances (Peters 
and Welch 1980; Ragsdale and Cook 1987).  
 Incumbents in safe seats still receive a large number of campaign contributions. 
Additionally, incumbents have a fundraising advantage over challengers during every stage 
of the electoral cycle, thus providing evidence that contributors are providing contributions 
even when the outcome of the election is certain (Krasno, Green and Cowden 1994).   
 The start of the legislative session is the third critical time point in understanding 
patterns of contributions. The decision to give a contribution prior to or at the beginning of 
the legislative session is based on several considerations. First, legal restrictions on when 
contributions can be given have to be considered. If contributions are prohibited during the 
legislative session, the beginning of the legislative session becomes much more important 
since this is the closest possible time in which a contribution can be given prior to the 
consideration of a piece of legislation. Second, it is often unclear as to the precise timing of 
the consideration of legislation, hence contributors may give a contribution at the beginning 
of the legislative session due to the uncertainty of when the legislation will be considered.  
 The fourth critical point in understanding contribution patterns is the introduction of 
a bill in the legislature. The introduction of a piece of legislation is a motivating factor to 
contributors with a stake in the legislation and often results in the mobilization of supporters 
and opponents of the legislation. Additionally, legislators are less likely to have entrenched 
positions on a piece of legislation early in the process, and consequently may be easier to 
persuade at this point in the process.  
In some legislatures, the leadership controls the legislative agenda, therefore, 
contributions to the leadership may provide interest groups with the most efficient use of 
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resources in attempting to gain influence over policy outcomes (Thielemann and Dixon 
1994). This may especially be the case for groups desiring to keep legislation off the 
calendar, since the leadership can kill legislation without consideration by other members. A 
contribution to the leadership for desired legislation may have the benefit of placing the 
issue on the agenda, however, it does not necessarily result in a positive outcome for the 
legislation. The legislative process is geared toward maintaining the status quo, subsequently 
interest groups may find it much easier to defeat unwanted legislation than to pass desired 
legislation.  
 The fifth critical point in understanding contribution patterns is the consideration of 
legislation in committee. Committees have a great deal of power to determine the fate of a 
piece of legislation. Opponents of a piece of legislation able to garner committee support for 
their position, can be successful in defeating legislation even if it enjoys majority support in 
the whole legislature. The choice to contribute at this stage in the process likely depends 
upon the composition of the committee and the likelihood of being able to influence the 
outcome of the legislation. Additionally, contributions are likely to be targeted toward the 
committee chair, whom may be in the best position to exercise influence over the legislative 
process.  
The power of committees varies from one state to another depending upon the rules 
of that state9. The role of the committee system in the legislative process will be a major 
determining factor in the decision to donate money to committee members and in particular 
to the committee chair (Denzau and Munger 1986; Grier and Munger 1991; Welch 1974). If 
the committee is in the position to kill legislation, then contributors are more likely to give 
money to committee members in order to achieve the desired outcome (Romer and Snyder 
                                                 
9
 See Francis (1989) for a detailed discussion of committee power in state legislatures. 
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1994; Gopoian 1984). Wright (1985) concluded that positions in the leadership and on 
important committees in most cases result in large contributions. A strong committee system 
with the power to kill legislation will result in more contributions directed toward committee 
members prior to the consideration of legislation.  
 The sixth critical point in understanding contribution patterns is the floor vote on a 
bill. The floor vote represents the last opportunity for contributors to impact the outcome of 
legislation of concern to them. At this stage in the process, contributors can target legislators 
who are setting on the fence in the effort to persuade him or her to support the position of 
the contributor. Also, upon completion of the vote, contributors may reward support of their 
positions. 
In some legislatures the leadership controls the legislative agenda, therefore 
contributions to the leadership may provide interest groups with the most efficient use of 
resources in attempting to gain influence over policy outcomes (Thielemann and Dixon 
1994). This may especially be the case for groups desiring to keep legislation off the 
calendar since the leadership can kill legislation without consideration by other members. A 
contribution to the leadership for legislation that the contributor desires may have the benefit 
of placing the issue on the agenda, however, it does not necessarily result in a positive 
outcome for the legislation. The legislative process is geared toward maintaining the status 
quo, hence interest groups may find it much easier to defeat unwanted legislation than to 
pass desired legislation.  
 The seventh and final critical point in understanding contributions patterns is the end 
of the legislative session. The close of the legislative session is especially important in states 
were legal restrictions are placed on the contributions during the legislative session. The 
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close of the legislative session provides the opportunity to reward legislators for their votes 
during the legislative session. 
  
2. Particularistic Contributors 
 Particularistic contributors attempt to influence the outcome of legislative votes 
important to them. Particularistic contributors have potential incentives to contribute at all 
seven critical time points. First, particularistic contributors hope to elect individuals that are 
the most likely to support their position, accordingly they have to determine if they should 
contribute prior to the primary. A contributor may practice an influencing strategy by giving 
a contribution prior to the primary. The purpose of the influencing strategy during the 
primary is to elect the preferred candidate that is most likely to support legislation of interest 
to the contributor. A contribution during the primary is more likely to occur in a competitive 
election to help with the election of the preferred candidate. In addition to evaluating the 
probability of electoral success of the preferred candidate during the primary, particularistic 
contributors also must look forward to the probability of success in the general election. If 
the probability of success during the primary is high but the likelihood of success during the 
general election is low, then a contribution during the primary may be wasted since the 
preferred candidate will not be in a position to influence legislative outcomes. If the election 
of the preferred candidate is not in doubt, some contributors may continue to practice an 
influencing strategy for future considerations. However, some contributors may choose to 
employ a free rider strategy in which they do not give a contribution since the election of 
their preferred candidate is assured. 
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 Particularistic contributors also have incentives to give contributions prior to the 
general election. As with the primary, particularistic contributors may give prior to the 
general election in the hope of electing the candidate most likely to be supportive of their 
legislative position. Particularistic contributors have to evaluate their preferred candidate’s 
probability of success in the general election in determining whether to provide an 
influencing contribution prior to the election or to practice a free rider strategy.  
 During the primary and general elections, particularistic contributors have to 
consider any legal restrictions that may prohibit them from contributing closer to an 
important legislative vote. If contributions are limited during the legislative session, some 
particularistic contributors may change their strategy and practice an influencing strategy 
during the primary or general election. Also, contributors may desire to hide their true 
motivations and therefore give a contribution during the primary or general election.  
 Particularistic contributors also have incentives to provide contributions prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session. The probability of providing an influencing contribution 
prior to the beginning of the legislative session is greater when contributions are prohibited 
during the legislative session. A contributor providing an influencing contribution prior to 
the beginning of the legislative session represents the closest point prior to consideration of 
a piece of legislation that a contribution can be legally given. Additionally, some 
particularistic contributors may give contributions prior to the beginning of the legislative 
session to avoid the appearance of trying to influence legislative outcomes by giving a 
contribution closer to the legislative vote.  
 Particularistic contributors have incentives to give contributions prior to the 
introduction of a bill of concern to the contributor, which is the fourth critical time point in 
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understanding contribution patterns. Particularistic contributors may give an influencing 
contribution prior to the introduction of the legislation in order to persuade the legislator to 
support his or her position. If the contributor believes a favorable outcome on the legislation 
is likely, he or she may choose to free ride since the contribution is not needed to achieve the 
desired outcome.  
  Particularistic contributors also have an incentive to provide a contribution when a 
piece of legislation of concern is being considered in committee. Contributions to committee 
members, and especially to the chair of the committee, may be one of the most cost efficient 
means of achieving a desired outcome. Contributors have to weigh the probability of 
achieving the desired outcome in their decision to provide a contribution. If a positive 
outcome is highly likely, then a contributor may be more likely to employ a free rider 
strategy. Furthermore, in states that prohibit contributions during legislative sessions 
contributors have to employ an alternative strategy to influence the legislative outcome. 
Contributions to persuade committee members may be especially important when the defeat 
of a piece of legislation is the desired outcome. Committees can often kill legislation without 
it ever reaching the floor, therefore making an influencing contribution is especially 
important on legislation with majority support in the legislature.  
 The floor vote on a bill of interest is the sixth critical time point in understanding 
contribution patterns. Contributors may choose to employ a variety of strategies based on 
the probability of success or for future success. A contributor may give an influencing 
contribution prior to the floor vote in the hope of influencing the outcome of the vote. A 
contributor may choose to practice a reward strategy were they give a contribution after a 
vote to a supportive legislator. Additionally, some contributors may choose to practice an 
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influencing reward strategy were they give a contribution before and after a positive vote by 
the legislator. This type of strategy reinforces the positive vote and serves as a motivation to 
the legislator to support the contributor in the future.   
 Contributors may choose to give contributions to legislators even when they fail to 
support their position. These types of strategies, while not as common, may occur under 
some circumstances. A contributor practicing a future influencing strategy provides a 
contribution following a negative in the hope of influencing future votes in the legislature. 
Additionally, the contributor may have received a signal that future support is likely though 
it may not have been possible on this vote for political reasons.  
 Following a negative vote, a contributor who was planning to reward the legislator 
for a positive vote withholds the contribution following a negative vote as a punishment for 
failure to support the contributor’s position. Additionally, a contributor who provided a 
contribution prior to a negative vote and was planning on rewarding a contributor after a 
positive vote practices and influencing punishment strategy by withholding a contribution 
following a negative vote.  Finally, although not that likely some contributors may give 
contributions before and after a negative vote thus practicing an influencing/future 
influencing strategy. This type of strategy is most likely to occur when the contributor is 
highly certain that support will be forthcoming on future legislation.  
 Some particularistic contributors also have incentives to provide, or fail to provide, a 
contribution at the end of the legislative session, which is our final critical time point in 
understanding contribution patterns. The end of the session is especially important in states 
were contributions are prohibited during the legislative session, since the end of the session 
  
 
 
78 
provides contributors with the opportunity to reward positive votes during the legislative 
session or to punish negative votes during the session by not providing a contribution.  
 
2.1. Summary of Particularistic Strategies 
 Particularistic contributors have incentives to provide contributions at all seven 
critical time points. At the first five time points, particularistic contributors can choose to 
make an influencing contribution or to free ride. Contributors have a variety of different 
strategies to employ before and after a floor vote on a bill. Contributors may attempt to 
influence not only the current bill under consideration but future legislation of interest to the 
contributor. Additionally, some particularistic contributors may choose to punish non-
supportive legislators. The choice of strategies is dependent upon a variety of factors 
including legal restrictions and the amount of resources available to the contributor. 
 
3. Universalistic contributors 
 Universalistic contributors are motivated by election considerations and therefore 
respond differently to the seven critical time points in understanding contribution patterns. 
Universalistic contributors are only concerned about the primary and the general election 
and are not motivated to contribute at the final five critical time points. Universalistic 
contributors provide contributions to influence the outcome of the primary or general 
election or they may choose to free ride. The probability of their preferred candidate’s 
electoral success is a primary consideration in determining whether to give a contribution.  
 
 
  
 
 
79 
4. Summary of contribution patterns. 
 Particularistic and universalistic contributors have incentives to contribute at both the 
general election and primary election.  Given that both types of contributors have incentives 
to give prior to the primary and general elections, it is not possible to determine if 
contributions given prior to the primary and general election are particularistic or 
universalistic. However, only particularistic contributions are expected in close proximity to 
the other five critical time points. It is expected that the greatest increase in contributions 
will occur prior to the election since all contributors have an incentive to give prior to the 
election.  
 In summary contributors follow one of eight strategies when deciding when to 
provide contributions. Universalistic contributors in general practice an influencing strategy 
or a free rider strategy. Particularistic contributors, however, may practice any one of the 
eight possible strategies   Different strategies will be employed with different legislators at 
different times; therefore, these strategies are not mutually exclusive. The eight possible 
contributor strategies are summarized as follows: 
Influencing Strategy – contribution given prior to major vote. 
Influencing Reward Strategy – contribution given prior to and after a positive vote. 
Reward Strategy – contribution given following a positive vote. 
Free Rider Strategy – contributions given neither before nor after a positive vote. 
Influencing Punishment Strategy – contribution given prior to but not after a 
negative vote. 
Punishment Strategy – contribution withheld following a negative vote. 
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Influencing/Future Influencing Strategy - contribution given before and after a 
negative vote. 
Future Influencing Strategy - contribution given following a negative vote. 
 
5. Hypotheses 
 The first hypothesis for this study is that the proximity to the general election will be 
the best predictor of campaign contributions. As discussed previously, PACs have to make 
decisions at the various stages of the political process as to whether they should contributor 
or not. Universalistic contributors will always contribute close to the election unless they are 
employing a free rider strategy, because they expect their preferred candidate to win the 
election easily. In addition to the universalistic contributors, particularistic contributors also 
have to make a decision if they should contribute close to the election. Particularistic 
contributors may choose to give a contribution close to the election if they believe their 
preferred candidate is in jeopardy of being defeated in the election or in the effort to 
influence future legislative vote outcomes.  Therefore, the general election is expected to be 
the best predictor of campaign contribution because both universalistic and particularistic 
contributors are expected to give contributions close to the election. 
 The second hypothesis in this study is that proximity to an important legislative vote 
increases the number of contributions given. Additionally, it is expected that contributions 
will increase during the legislative session, thereby providing further evidence that 
contributions are being given with the hope of influencing the outcome of an important 
legislative vote. It is expected that the proximity to an important legislative vote is 
significant in explaining campaign contributions. However, the increase in contributions is 
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not expected to be as great as the increase surrounding the election. Furthermore, 
particularistic voters are also giving contributions during the election period, thereby 
overestimating the number of contributions given with the sole hope of influencing the 
outcome of the election. 
 Some states such as Utah and New Mexico limit campaign contributions during the 
legislative session, thereby diminishing the opportunity to give a contribution in close 
proximity to an important legislative vote. A session limit does not eliminate the opportunity 
to give contributions in close to the legislative vote if the vote occurs close to the beginning 
or end of the legislative session, however, it does make it more difficult to give contributions 
close to an important legislative vote. Furthermore, the implementation of a session limit 
may discourage the giving of a contribution as it increases the distance between the time the 
contribution is given and the vote in the legislature occurs, thus making the contribution less 
effective in influencing the legislative outcome.  
 The third hypothesis in this study is that the increase in the number of contributions 
surrounding the general election will be greater in states with limits during legislative 
sessions than in states with no such limits. It is expected that particularistic contributors 
attempt to gain undue influence in the legislative process by getting those individuals most 
likely to support the contributor’s position elected. Additionally, contributions may be given 
during the election season in the attempt to influence future legislative outcomes or to 
reward past behavior. When particularistic contributors are confronted with session limits on 
contributions, the number of opportunities to give contributions is diminished, thereby 
increasing the probability of giving a contribution prior to the election. 
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 The fourth hypothesis in this study is that an increase in contributions will occur 
prior to the beginning of the session in states with session limits on contributions. The 
rationale for this hypothesis is that due to the legal restrictions placed on contributions 
during the legislative session, particularistic contributors will shift their contributions to 
prior to the beginning of the legislative session in order to influence votes during the 
legislative session. When faced with a session limit, it is expected the contributor will 
attempt to minimize the amount of time between the time the contribution is give and the 
vote of an important piece of legislation, hence it is reasonable to assume that particularistic 
contributors will give contributions prior to the beginning of the legislative session in the 
effort to minimize the amount of time between the contribution and the vote in the 
legislature. 
 The fifth hypothesis for this study is that an increase in contributions will occur 
immediately after the end of the session in states with limits on session contributions. It is 
expected that in states where contributors are prohibited to give contributions during a 
legislative session that particularistic contributors will shift their contributions to 
immediately following the session as a reward for supporting the contributor during the 
legislative session. In some cases, particularistic contributors may not anticipate legislation 
upcoming during a legislative session and therefore may attempt to persuade a legislator to 
support their position during the legislative session in turn for the promise of a contribution 
when the legal restrictions are no longer in affect. Additionally, a particularistic contributor 
may give a contribution at the end of the session to think the member for their support 
during the session and to influence votes they may come up in the future.   
 In summary, this dissertation will address the following five hypotheses: 
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Hypothesis 1: The proximity to the general election will be the best predictor of  
  campaign contributions. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The proximity to an important legislative vote increases the number  
  of contributions given. 
 
Hypothesis 3: The increase in the number of contributions surrounding the  
general election will be greater in states with limits during  
legislative sessions than in states with no such limits. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Contributions will increase prior to the beginning of the session in  
  states with session limits on contributions 
 
Hypothesis 5: Contributions will increase immediately after the end of the session  
  in states with limits on contributions given during legislative  
  sessions 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the motivations and strategies employed by political 
action committees and other contributors in deciding if and when to give a campaign 
contribution. Particularistic contributors are attempting to influence elections, so in turn they 
are in a better position to influence policy outcomes. It is not possible to determine what 
percentage of the contributions given close to the general and primary elections are 
particularistic, since universalistic and particularistic contributors both have an incentive to 
give contributions close to the election. This results in an underestimation of the number of 
particularistic contributors, since some particularistic contributors are giving prior to the 
election. Therefore, evidence of interest group activity to influence legislative outcomes is 
likely to underestimate the full extent of the particularistic motives of contributors. Given 
the fact that particularistic contributions are likely to be underestimated, evidence of 
particularistic contributions will provide greater confidence that contributors are trying to 
exercise undue influence on legislative outcomes.  
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The campaign finance literature has addressed a wide array of issues in the campaign 
finance system. However, little research has addressed many of the same important 
questions at the state level. This research will address the argument between particularistic 
and universalistic contributors by expanding previous research to the state level. Through 
this research, a greater understanding will be provided as to the motivations behind 
campaign contributions. Through an examination of the timing of contributions at the 
federal level Stratmann (1992, 1998, 2000) finds that major votes are better indicators of 
campaign contributions than the proximity to the election. Through an examination of states, 
we gain a better understanding of how legislative structure and context influences 
contribution decisions.  
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Chapter 5: Data and Model of Legislative Contributions 
 
 In the previous chapter I discussed two primary motivations of campaign 
contributions and how these motives structure the decision of when or if to provide a 
contribution. The timing of campaign contributions is conditioned on the motivation of the 
contributor and the legal framework for contributions in that state. As previously illustrated, 
contributors provide contributions to candidates with two primary motivations. First, some 
contributors are attempting to influence the outcome of elections. Second, contributors are 
attempting to influence the outcome of legislation. It is expected that the greatest increase in 
contributions will occur close to the election, however, proximity to a major legislative vote 
is also expected to be significant in explaining contribution patterns in state legislatures. In 
this chapter I identify the twenty-five bills that are examined. For each bill, I determine if 
contributions increased while the bill was under consideration by the legislature. 
Furthermore, in this chapter I establish a model to explain contribution patterns in state 
legislatures and shed some light on the motivation of contributors. 
 The model established in this chapter analyzes the pattern of contributions 
surrounding six important events. It is expected that the number of contributions increases 
the closer the proximity to the primary or general election. Additionally, it is expected that 
contributions increase when legislation of concern to a political action committee is under 
consideration. However, the actions of contributors are expected to be adapted to address 
legal restrictions faced by the political action committee.  For example, it is expected that 
contributions prior to the beginning of the legislative session will be greater in states that 
prohibit contributions during the session. Furthermore, it is expected that contributions will 
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increase following the legislative session in states that prohibit contributions during the 
legislative session.  
 
1. Model of campaign contributions 
 
A contributor fixed effects model is used to test for increased or decreased levels of 
contributions for each contributor. The dependent variable is the number of contributions 
given by a political action committee during the course of a week. The model is estimated 
using a Negative Binomial regression in which the dependent variable indicates the number 
of contributions given by each contributor during each week included in the analysis.  
 Each political action committee has a count of the number of contributions given for 
each week included in the two-year analysis; hence there are 104 different measurements of 
the dependent variable that consist of the number of contributions given by each PAC during 
each week. For example, if during week three a PAC gave three contributions, then the 
dependent variable is coded as 3.  If they did not contribute during that week then the 
dependent variable would be coded as 0. A negative binomial estimation technique will be 
employed to estimate the model given the fact that the Poisson method assumes that the 
mean and the variance are equal and can provide bias estimations in cases of over 
dispersion.  
Six explanatory variables are included in the model to determine the impact of the 
primary election, general election, and legislative vote event on contribution patterns. The 
primary election variable is coded as 1 for each week during the two months prior to the 
primary and 0 for all other weeks. It is expected that contributions will increase during the 
two months leading up to the primary. Second, the model includes a general election 
variable coded as 1 for each week during the two months prior to the election and 0 during 
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all other weeks. Third, the vote event variable is coded as 1 from three weeks prior to the 
legislation being reported out of committee to three weeks following the floor vote. This 
specification takes into account that some contributors will give contributions after a vote to 
reward the member for a positive vote. Additionally, the vote event variable will only be 
included in the model in states in which it is legal to give contributions during the legislative 
session. Forth, the model includes a variable for the legislative session. The session variable 
is coded as 1 if the legislature is in session and as 0 if the legislature is not in session. 
Campaign contributions are expected to increase during the legislative session unless 
prohibited by law. PACs attempting to influence legislative outcomes become more active. 
A variable for the beginning of the legislative session is also included in the model. The 
variable is coded as 1 for the two weeks prior to the beginning of the legislative session and 
as 0 during all other weeks. It is expected that contributions will increase prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session in an effort to influence legislation considered during the 
session. Furthermore, interest group activity prior to the beginning of the legislative session 
is expected to be especially active in states in which contributions are prohibited during the 
session. Inclusion of the beginning of the session variable in the model allows for a 
determination of the strategies employed by PACs. It is important to understand the 
strategies of contributors in order to reform the current system to lessen the undue influence 
of money in the political system. In addition to determining if interest groups are engaging 
in influencing behavior a variable for the end of session is included in the model to 
determine if interest groups are practicing a reward strategy. It is expected that PACs will 
provide contributions at the end of the legislative session in order to reward the behavior of 
legislators during the legislative session. Reward before is expected to be most prevalent in 
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states that do not allow contributions following the legislative session. The end of session 
variable is coded as a 1 for the two weeks following the end of the legislative session as 0 
during all other weeks.  
 In summary, the dependent variable for this study is the number of contributions 
given by a political action committee to legislators in a week and the independent variables 
are proximity to the primary, proximity to the general election, proximity to a legislative 
vote, legislative session, beginning of the legislative session, and end of legislative session. 
The baseline for the model is all other weeks that are not part of the general election, 
primary, session, beginning of session, end of session and vote event variables. Positive 
coefficients indicate that contributions increased during that period in comparison to the 
baseline period when we hold all of the other variables constant. Conversely, a negative 
coefficient indicates that contributions decreased in comparison to the baseline period when 
we hold all other variables constant.   
The baseline period varies from one state to the next10. In New York, for example, 
the baseline period only consists of 9 weeks during the two-year period. New York is any 
session nearly year round, therefore, there are only a few weeks in the sample that are not 
part of the primary election, general election of the legislative session. On the other hand, in 
Utah the baseline consists of 65 weeks.  Contributions occur at all times during the course of 
the year including the baseline period. In many cases, the baseline period provides the best 
opportunity for legislators to engage in fundraising since they are not concerned with the 
business of the legislature or with campaigning.  
                                                 
10
 The baseline period consist of 20 weeks in California, 57 weeks in Georgia, 33 weeks in Illinois, 49 weeks in 
Kentucky, 54 weeks in New Mexico, 9 weeks in New York, 44 weeks in South Carolina, 65 weeks in Utah and 
13 weeks in Wisconsin. 
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This model will allow for a determination of the strategies employed by interest 
groups in attempting to influence legislation, and how strategies change with session limits. 
Furthermore, the analysis provides insight on the effectiveness of session limits in removing 
the undue influence of money from the political process, and the direction for future 
reforms.   For a summary of the model of legislative contributions, please see table 5.0. 
TABLE 5.0. ABOUT HERE 
2. Contribution data 
 The contribution data for this study is obtained from the National Institute on Money 
in State Politics11 web site www.followthemoney.org. The institute provides data on who 
contributes money, the amount of the contribution, and the date of the contribution.  
Additionally, contributors are coded by their sector of the economy. 12 The contributors 
selected for the analysis of each bill will consist of interest groups with a direct interest in 
the legislation under consideration. For example, interest groups with an interest in health 
care will be included in the analysis on a health care bill. 
 The National Institute of Money in State Politics provides a broad classification of 
interest groups. Interest groups are selected for each analysis based on those sectors of the 
economy that appeared to be most relevant to the piece of legislation. For minimum wage 
legislation, it was assumed that labor groups and business groups would have an invested 
interest in the legislation, therefore, groups for the labor and general business sector as 
classified by the National Institute of Money in State Politics are included in the analysis for 
                                                 
11
 The National Institute on Money in State Politics describes itself as “a nonpartisan, nonprofit program 
dedicated to accurate, comprehensive and unbiased documentation and research on campaign finance at the 
state level”.  
 
12
 For additional information of the coding scheme used by the National Institute on Money in State Politics 
please see their web site at http://www.followthemoney.org/database/coding.html. 
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minimum wage legislation.  These same sectors would also have an interest in workers 
compensation legislation. The broad classification of contributors by the National Institute 
of Money in State Politics creates the problem that interest groups not interested in 
influencing the outcome of a legislative vote may be included in the analysis. However, the 
inclusion of groups that may not be interested in the outcome of the legislation results in a 
greater likelihood of accepting the null hypothesis that no relationship exists between 
contribution activities and legislative votes. Given the increased likelihood of accepting the 
null hypothesis, we can have greater confidence in positive findings that a relationship does 
exist between contributions and legislative votes.  
 
3. States selected for this study 
 
 The full sample of states includes: California, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, New York, South Carolina, Utah, and Wisconsin. Of these nine states, four allow 
campaign contributions during a legislative session while five states do not allow campaign 
contributions during the session.  The states also vary on whether they allow corporations to 
give contributions directly to candidates. Illinois, Utah, and New Mexico allow corporations 
to give unlimited contributions to candidates. This provision in the campaign finance law 
results in the need for fewer political action committees, thus making the contributions of 
political committees not as significant in those states. Kentucky and Wisconsin, prohibit 
corporations from giving contributions to candidates, while in the other four states 
contributions by corporations are allowed, but limits are placed on the amount of the 
contributions.  
The nine states included in the study represent a cross section of the nation 
geographically with California from the west, New York from the northeast, Georgia in the 
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south, and Illinois in the Midwest. Furthermore, the sample includes states from a wide 
variety of professionalism levels. California and New York have highly professional 
legislatures meeting year around, while Kentucky and New Mexico have amateur 
legislatures. In addition to the variation of the sample across different levels of 
professionalism, the sample also includes states with a wide variety of different legal 
restrictions placed on the actions of contributors. For example, Georgia bans contributions 
during legislative sessions while California allows contributions during the session.   
 The variation of contribution restrictions across states provides the opportunity to 
examine the impact of such restrictions. It is expected that political action committee 
contributions will not be as significant in those states that allow unlimited contributions by 
corporations. In states with unlimited contributions allowed by corporations, the need to 
form a political committee is not as critical to provide contributions to try, and influence 
vote outcomes.  
 Additionally, the sample chosen for this study allows us to examine the impact of 
session restrictions on contributions. It is expected that when an interest group encounters a 
session ban on contributions, they will change their strategy. Instead of giving a contribution 
prior to a legislative vote in order to influence a vote outcome or following a legislative vote 
as a reward, contributors may shift those contributions to immediately prior to a legislative 
session to influence behavior during the legislative session or following the legislative 
session as a reward for a vote that occurred during the session. In addition to this when faced 
with a session limit, interest groups may shift their focus to the primary or general election. 
Hence, it is expected in states with limits on session contributions the proximity to the 
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general or primary election will play a more significant role in explaining contribution 
patterns. 
 
4. Legislation to be examined 
 
In this section, I provide an overview of the twenty-five pieces of legislation in nine 
different states examined in this study. For each of these twenty-five bills, I determined if a 
significant increase in the number of contributions occurred, surrounding the elections as 
well as surrounding the bill itself. There are two primary criteria in selecting the legislation 
examined in this study. First, the bills selected are from a diversity of states both from a 
geographical perspective as well as from a legislative professionalism perspective. Second, 
the states selected represent a diversity of campaign finance laws. In particular, states 
included both allow and prohibit campaign contributions during legislative sessions. This 
study examines twenty-five bills in nine states. These bills cover a range of different issues 
including health care, the minimum wage, workers compensation and so forth (for a 
summary of the legislation please see Table 5.1).  
TABLE 5.1. ABOUT HERE 
The twenty-five bills in this study are across the nine states from the 2001 and 2002 
legislative session. Legislation in this study is from bills selected by the National Federation 
of Independent Businesses for inclusion in their rating scores of state legislators. While 
these scores do not include all significant legislation considered during the session, they 
include a wide variety of issues including but not limited to health care, tax policy, 
environmental policy, education policy and so forth, thus making the bills representative of 
the most important legislation considered by the legislature. The selection of bills from the 
ratings by the National Federation of Independent Businesses allows easy identification of 
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the most important pieces of legislation considered during the legislative session and the 
ones most likely to attract interest group activity. The NFIB is concerned with a wide variety 
of political issues making these rating scores a good indicator of the most important 
legislation considered during the session. Bills in this study include those on some aspect of 
health care in eight states and concerning the minimum wage for seven states thus providing 
common issues across the majority of the states in the sample. Information on legislation 
action is from LexisNexis State Capital Universe.13 LexisNexis provides a database on the 
progress of bills through the legislative process. This database provides information as to 
when legislation was introduced, committee action occurred, and floor action occurred.  
Three bills in the study are from the California Senate. The first bill is SB 604 
concerning health care. This bill creates the Health and Wellness Promotion Advisory Board 
in the Department of Managed Care to advice the Legislature on medical testing and 
services appropriate for the health promotion program. Furthermore, the legislation requires 
every health plan and disability insure to provide certain tests and services to its subscribers 
with limited deductibles and co-payments. The bill faced opposition by insurance 
companies, but eventually passed the senate. However, the legislation encountered 
opposition in the House and failed to become law. 
 The second bill examined in California is Assembly Bill 2242, which adjusts the 
hourly minimum wage on January 1, 2003 and annually using the State Consumer Price 
Index. Additionally, the legislation provides that the Industrial Welfare Commission may 
not increase the minimum wage in 2003 and cannot review the minimum wage again until 
2013. The bill passed the assembly, however, was unable to get out of the Senate and 
therefore did not become law. 
                                                 
13
 http://web.lexis-nexis.com/stcapuniv/ 
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 The third bill examined in California is Senate Bill 71which authorizes the use of 
civil penalties for use in combating Worker’s compensation fraud. Additionally, the 
legislation eliminates the requirement that occupational safety and health loss control 
consultation services be certified by the Director of Industrial Relations and requires the 
director to levy and collect fees form Worker’s compensation insurers for safety programs. 
The legislation passed both the Assembly and the Senate, however, the governor vetoed the 
legislation on October 14, 2001.    
 I also examine three bills in Georgia. The first bill examined in Georgia was H.B. 
1568, the Natural Gas Consumer’s Relief Act, relates to the Public Service Commission. 
The act expands the powers of the commission by allowing them to seek injunctions when 
appropriate, and amends portions of the Natural Gas and Deregulation Act and helps in 
providing assistance to low-income residential customers. The legislation passed both 
Houses of the legislature and the governor signed it into law on April 25, 2002. 
 The second piece of legislation examined in Georgia is House Bill 1492, which 
changes provisions of the insurance coverage for equipment and self-management training 
for individuals with diabetes and provides provisions for enforcement. The legislation 
relates to major medical group health insurance policy, group insurance plan policy and 
other types of managed or capitated care plans or policies. The legislation passed both 
chambers of the legislature and was signed by the governor on May 9, 2002, 
 The third piece of legislation examined in Georgia Senate Bill 14which provides for 
an increase in the Georgia minimum wage law. Additionally, the law provides for changes 
relative to the federal minimum wage. The law passed both houses of the general assembly 
and was signed into law by the governor. 
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 I also consider three bills in Illinois. The first piece of legislation examined in Illinois 
is House Bill 2487 that creates the Illinois Family and Medical Leave Act. The act, with a 
few exceptions, provides for provisions similar to the federal Family and Medical Leave Act 
of 1993. The act passed the House but died in the Senate Rules committee. The second bill 
analyzed in Illinois is House Bill 4540, which amends the minimum wage law. The bill 
passed the House but failed to pass the Senate. The third bill examined in Illinois was Senate 
Bill 1341, which requires insurance coverage for serious mental illnesses to be provided on 
the same terms and conditions as are applicable to other illnesses and diseases. The bill 
pertains to insurance coverage provided under group insurance policies. The bill passed both 
houses of the legislature, and was signed by the governor on July 27, 2001. 
 I investigate two bills in the Kentucky House, both of which deal with black lung 
benefits for coal miners. House Bill 132 modifies the requirement that administrative law 
judges give “presumptive weight” to the findings of evaluators in coal worker’s 
pneumoconiosis claims. The legislation requires that employers give notice of denial or 
acceptance of a claim within 30 days of the commissioner issuing a notice of consensus 
reading and provides other procedures for claim procedures.  House Bill 132 passed the 
House but failed to pass the Senate. 
 Kentucky House Bill 348, introduced in 2002, is a revision of House Bill 132, 
considered in 2001. The bill requires that employers give notice of denial or acceptance of a 
claim, however, the legislation does not mandate a 30-day time limit as the previous version 
did. Additionally, House Bill 348 permits miners 57 years of age and older to receive 
income benefits for 425 weeks in lieu of training and education and requires referral to the 
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Department of Vocational Rehabilitation for assessment and services. House Bill 348 passed 
both houses of the legislature and was signed into law by the governor on April 13, 2002. 
 I examine three bills in New Mexico. The first bill examined is the Employee 
Protection Act. House Bill 62 prohibits employer retaliatory actions against employees in 
certain circumstances and provides for grievance procedures and penalties. The legislation 
failed to pass the House and the Senate did not consider the legislation. 
 The second piece of legislation examined is Senate Bill 439, which relates to the 
Minimum Healthcare Protection Act. The legislation provides group health insurance for 
smaller groups and provides for managed care. The legislation passed the Senate but failed 
to pass the House. The final bill examined in New Mexico is House Joint Resolution 8, 
which requires that the state minimum wage be at least equal to the minimum wage 
established by Federal Law. The legislation passed the House but failed to pass the Senate.  
 I investigate three bills in New York, with one bill analyzed in both the Assembly 
and the Senate.  Assembly Bill 11723, which requires the provision of coverage by health 
insurers of certain women’s health care and preventive care service, is examined in both 
chambers of the legislature. The legislation requires coverage of mammography screening 
and cervical cytology screening for those employed in more than one state. Furthermore, the 
legislation expands the frequency of mammography screening, coverage for contraceptive 
drugs and devices, and directs the superintendent of insurance to conduct a study. The 
legislation passed both chambers of the legislature and the governor signed it into law. 
 The second piece of legislation examined in New York is Assembly Bill 5132, which 
raises the state minimum wage and provides that annually such statutory wage shall be 
increased. The legislation faced opposition from Republicans and failed to pass the 
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Republican-controlled Senate after passing the Assembly. The final bill to be examined in 
New York is Assembly Bill 11624, which extends the Unemployment Benefits Act of 2002. 
The legislation passed the Assembly but failed to pass the Senate. 
 I examined three bills in South Carolina. The first bill establishes a task force to 
conduct a comprehensive review of health insurance mandates and to provide a report to the 
General Assembly. House Bill 4583 passed both the House and Senate and the governor 
signed the bill into law on July 1, 2002. The second bill examined in South Carolina is 
House Bill 3289, which prohibits a subdivision of the state from establishing, mandating, or 
requiring a minimum wage that exceeds the federal minimum wage. The legislation passed 
both the House and Senate and became law without the governor singing the legislation. 
 The final bill examined in South Carolina is House Bill 3142, which requires the 
directors of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation to ensure compliance with 
the provisions concerning the right to work. The legislation prohibits an employer from 
requiring or prohibiting membership in a labor organization as a condition for employment. 
House Bill 342 passed both the House and the Senate and was signed by the governor on 
July 26, 2002.  
 I investigate three bills in Utah. House Bill 105 modifies the insurance code to create 
a pilot program which requires accident and health insurance plans offered on a group basis 
to state employees to adopt health insurance mandates proposed for other accident and 
health insurance plans for one year and to report the cost and benefits of the mandate to the 
Commissioner of Insurance. The legislation passed both houses of the legislature and was 
signed into law by the governor on March 26, 2002. 
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 The second bill examined in Utah is House Bill 238, which modifies the Cigarette 
and Tobacco Tax Licensing Act. The act increased the tax levied on cigarettes and specifies 
that a portion of the revenue raised would go toward prevention programs and another 
portion would go toward cancer research and medical education. 
 The third bill examined in Utah is Senate Bill 138, which modifies the minimum 
wage law to prohibit cities, towns, and counties from establishing a minimum wage that is 
greater than the federal minimum wage. The law passed both chambers of the legislature and 
the governor signed it into law on March 19, 2001.   
 Finally, I examine one bill in Wisconsin, which makes changes to the Worker’s 
Compensation Law relating to liability for disability caused by unnecessary treatment. 
Senate Bill 252 also addresses maximum compensation amounts, methods of calculating 
compensation, vocational rehabilitation, offers of suitable employment, payment of benefits, 
and program administration. The bill passed both chambers of the legislature and was signed 
into law by the governor on December 17, 2001. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I have introduced a model of legislative contributions that will be 
tested using a negative binomial regression. It is expected that campaign contributions will 
increase close to the primary and general elections as well as close to the time when a piece 
of legislation of interest to the political action committee is under consideration, however, 
the actions of contributors are constrained by various campaign finance laws which I 
discussed in this chapter. I examine the pattern of contributions surrounding twenty-five 
pieces of legislation in nine states. From an analysis of the twenty-five pieces of legislation, 
we will be able to determine if elections are the most important factor in explaining 
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campaign contributions in the states. Additionally, while the model set forth in this chapter 
will not allow us to determine the full extent of the number of particularistic contributors it 
will allow us to determine if some contributors are attempting to influence the outcome of 
legislative votes. Given the fact that the model presented in this chapter will tend to 
underestimate the number of particularistic contributors, we can have greater confidence in 
findings that reveal interest groups that are attempting to influence the outcome of 
legislative votes. Through the testing of this model we will gain some insight on the actions 
of contributors and if they are attempting to gain undue influence in the legislative process.  
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Table 5.0. Model of Legislative Contributions 
Dependent Variable Number of Contributions Count of the number of 
campaign contributions 
given by each contributor 
each week. 
Independent Variable General Election Coded 1 in each of the eight 
weeks prior to the general 
election and during election 
week and coded as 0 in all 
other weeks. 
Independent Variable Primary Election Coded 1 in each of the eight 
weeks prior to the primary 
election and during primary 
week and coded as 0 in all 
other weeks. 
Independent Variable 
(Included in models for 
states that allow 
contributions during the 
legislative session) 
Legislative Vote Event Coded 1 from three weeks 
prior to the legislation being 
reported out of committee 
to three weeks following the 
floor vote. 
Independent Variable Legislative Session Coded 1 for each week the 
legislature is in session and 
coded 0 in all other weeks. 
Independent Variable Beginning of Session Coded 1 for each of the two 
weeks prior to the 
beginning of the legislative 
session and coded 0 in all 
other weeks 
Independent Variable End of Session Coded 1 for each of the two 
weeks following the end of 
the legislative session and 
coded 0 in all other weeks 
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Chapter 6: The Pattern of Campaign Contributions 
 
 The findings in this study provide support for four out of the five hypotheses 
discussed in chapter four. The general election is consistently the most important factor in 
explaining campaign contribution patterns in state legislatures. However, the results also 
support hypothesis two that contributors are also attempting to influence legislative 
outcomes. Additionally, it appears PACs are more likely to provide contributions prior to the 
legislative session as an attempt to influence the session than as a reward following the 
conclusion of the legislative session. Influencing behavior is especially prevalent in states 
prohibiting contributions during the legislative session.  Reward behavior occurred only in 
highly professional states that allow contributions during the legislative session. These 
findings taken collectively paint a picture of an interest group behaving in a strategic manner 
with the belief they can influence the outcome of important legislative votes. First, it is 
critical to elect supportive legislators, hence political action committees are targeting 
elections to elect their preferred candidate. Second, interest groups are targeting important 
legislation believing they can influence the outcome of important legislative votes. Finally, 
when faced with legal restrictions, such as bans on contributions during the legislative 
session, interest groups employ alternative strategies such as providing contributions prior to 
the beginning of the legislative session 
 In this chapter I first examine the pattern of campaign contributions surrounding 
general and primary elections. Second, I examine the pattern of campaign contributions 
surrounding legislative votes important to the contributor. Third, I examine the impact of 
session limits on campaign contribution patterns. Finally, I provide insight into the 
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relationship between contribution patterns and legislative professionalism. These findings 
allow for a better understanding of the behavior of interest groups and an understanding of 
the impact of campaign finance regulations. 
  
1. The Impact of Elections on Campaign Contributions 
 The general election and the primary election was a significant and positive factor in 
increasing campaign contributions in all states in the sample.  These findings reveal that 
contributions increase in the two months prior to the election and some PACs are likely 
attempting to influence election outcomes. The motivation behind these contributions is not 
clear, however, since universalistic and particularistic contributors have incentives to give 
contributions prior to the election.  
The general election saw on average a 514% increase in contributions with respect to 
the baseline across the entire sample and the primary election saw on average a 308% 
increase in campaign contributions (see table 6.0.). Additionally, the general election was 
the largest factor explaining contributions in six out of the nine states included in the sample 
with the primary being the largest factor in explaining the increase of contributions in 
Illinois, and South Carolina and the beginning of the legislative session being the most 
important factor in California. These findings provide support for hypothesis one, that the 
general election is the most important factor in explaining campaign contributions. 
However, it does not diminish the fact that legislation still plays a key role in understanding 
contribution patterns in state legislatures. Furthermore, it is expected that a portion of the 
increase in campaign contributions surrounding the election can be contributed to an overall 
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particularistic strategy by political action committees who are trying to increase the 
likelihood of election of a preferred candidate. 
TABLE 6.0. ABOUT HERE 
 The greatest increase of campaign contributions surrounding the general election 
occurred in New Mexico, with an average increase in contributions with respect to the 
baseline of 1554% across the two significant pieces of legislation. In Utah there was an 
average increase of 924% across the three significant pieces of legislation. These two states 
have similar campaign finance laws, including the prohibition of contributions during 
legislative sessions. The similarity of these two states in terms of legislative professionalism, 
campaign finance laws, and the high increase in contributions surrounding the general 
election provides evidence that the behavior of PACs is structured by the institution in 
which they operate. 
 
2. The Impact of Legislative Votes on Contribution Patterns 
While contributions increased, as expected, close to the general and primary election, 
there is evidence that interest groups, in some cases, were also directly targeting 
contributions to influence legislation being considered by the state legislature. The 
consideration of legislation exerted a positive influence on the number of contributions in 
eight out of the twenty-five bills examined, thus providing support for hypothesis two. 
Additionally, the eight significant pieces of legislation were in four different states. In three 
of these cases, the state had no limits on contributions given during a legislation session. In 
South Carolina, limits exist on contributions given during a session, but those limits only 
pertain to lobbyist thus accounting for the finding in South Carolina. This study also 
  
 
 
109 
provides some evidence that, when faced with legal restrictions, interest groups employ 
alternative strategies that allow them to influence legislation even when faced with legal 
restrictions. 
 The findings reveal that in 32% of the cases contributions increase prior to a major 
legislative vote. While on the surface this may not appear to be very impressive, further 
analysis provides strong evidence of the efforts of interest groups to influence policy 
outcomes. The findings revealed in this dissertation likely underestimate the true number of 
particularistic contributors for several reasons. First, the measurement created in this study 
defines particularistic contributors as interest groups giving a contribution immediately 
before and after the consideration of a piece of legislation. The measurement does not 
account for particularistic contributors giving prior to the election, thereby underestimating 
the true number of particularistic contributors. Second, contributors face different legal 
restrictions on when they can give contributions. When we account for the legal restrictions 
faced by contributors, the number of particularistic contributors becomes even more 
impressive.   
   
2.1. States without Session Limits on Campaign Contributions 
 Four states in the study place no restrictions on campaign contributions during a 
legislative session. This study includes twelve bills in the four states without session limits. 
Seven out of these twelve bills exerted a significant increase on the number of contributions 
given to members of the legislature (see Table 6.1), thus providing additional support for 
hypothesis two. Furthermore, at least one bill was significant in   
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explaining contributions in each of the four states without limitations on contributions 
during legislative sessions.   
TABLE 6.1. ABOUT HERE 
In addition to the increases in campaign contributions surrounding specific bills, 
campaign contributions in general increased during the legislative session in California and 
New York. On average, a 116% increase in contributions occurred in California and a 208% 
increase occurred in New York while the legislature was in session with respect to the 
baseline period.  The increase in contributions during the legislative session provides 
additional evidence that political action committees were attempting to influence the 
outcome of legislation by providing contributions during the session. Kentucky and Illinois 
saw a decrease in contributions during the legislative session (see Table 6.1.). The difference 
in interest group activity may be the product of the fact that California, and New York are 
highly professional states that meet in long sessions, thus providing contributors with fewer 
opportunities to give contributions when the legislature is not in session. Furthermore, 
Illinois has the least number of restrictions on contributors thus freeing contributors to give 
contributions at any time and without restriction.  
California Senate Bill 604, which created a Health and Wellness Promotion 
Advisory Board, stimulated interest group activity in the California Senate (see table 6.2). 
Insurance companies were greatly opposed to the legislation, which required insurers to 
provide coverage for certain tests and to limit deductibles and copays. The legislation 
enjoyed the greatest level of support in the Senate, which eventually passed the bill, 
therefore insurance companies and other related business interest groups focused a great 
deal of effort in attempting to influence the legislation in the Senate. While they were not 
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successful in defeating the legislation in the Senate, the House failed to pass the legislation, 
thus protecting the interest of the insurance companies. The minimum wage legislation in 
California also exerted a positive significant increase in contributions, therefore, in two out 
of the three cases in California contributors attempted to influence the outcome of legislation 
in the California Senate, thus providing support for the second hypothesis.   
TABLE 6.2. ABOUT HERE 
 The medical leave bill in Illinois also stimulated activity among contributors 
resulting in a 117% increase in contributions when the legislation was under consideration. 
The remaining two bills in Illinois resulted in a positive, but non-significant increase in PAC 
activity. The findings in Illinois provide additional support for the second hypothesis that 
PACs are attempting to influence the outcome of legislative votes. 
TABLE 6.3. ABOUT HERE 
The fourth bill found to exert a positive significant influence in states without session 
limits is the worker’s compensation bill in Kentucky (see table 6.4.). A 260% increase in 
contributions occurred surrounding the consideration of the legislation indicating that 
political action committees were active in trying to influence the outcome of the black lung 
legislation. However, Kentucky saw a decrease in contributions during the legislative 
session. Still, contributors interested in the black lung legislation were active in trying to 
influence the outcome of the bill.  
TABLE 6.4. ABOUT HERE 
The fifth bill found to be significant is the New York Senate women’s health care 
bill (see table 6.5.). The legislation promoted interest group activity, with a 126% increase in 
contributions occurring surrounding the time the legislation was under consideration. The 
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same bill was also significant in the state house, resulting in a 164% increase in 
contributions in the lower chamber. The final bill found significant in the New York 
Assembly was the New York unemployment benefits legislation. The legislation resulted in 
a 218% increase in contributions. Despite opposition by business groups, the legislation was 
still able to pass the Democratic House before failing in the Republican Senate.  New York 
provides additional support for hypothesis two. The findings for the four states with no 
session limits reveal direct evidence of PACs attempting to influence legislative outcomes in 
58% of the cases thus bolstering support of the second hypothesis. 
TABLE 6.5. ABOUT HERE 
2.2. States with prohibitions on campaign contributions during legislative sessions 
 Three states in the sample prohibit all contributions during a legislative session, 
therefore, PACs are unable to provide legal contributions during the legislative session. 
Interest group activity was examined surrounding nine bills in three states with session 
limits on contributions. The legislative session was found to result in a significant decrease 
in contributions in eight out of the nine cases, thus indicating that session limits were 
successful in limiting contributions close to a legislative vote (see Tables 6.6-6.8).  In order 
to give a contribution during the legislative session a contributor would be breaking the law 
and is not willing to go that far to contribute.  These findings, however, do not indicate that 
session limits are successful in removing the undue influence of money from the legislative 
process. The inability of contributors to give during the legislative session results in 
particularistic contributors having to employ alternative strategies in order to influence 
policy outcomes.  
 TABLES 6.6. TO 6.8. ABOUT HERE  
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The employee protection act (HB 62) in New Mexico results in a 15% decrease in 
contributions when the legislature was in session. Additionally, the New Mexico minimum 
wage bill (HJR 8) saw a 13% decrease in contributions (see Table 6.6). Contributions by 
contributors concerned with the Utah health insurance decrease by 36% during the session, 
while the minimum wage bill results in a 34% decrease in contributions, and the health 
insurance bills results in a 9% decrease in contributions by interested contributors during the 
legislative session (see Table 6.7). These findings are consistent with what we expected to 
find given the prohibition of contributions during the legislative session.  
 Additionally, as expected in the states with prohibitions on campaign contributions, 
legislative activity was found to be negatively related with contributions in eight out of the 
nine cases, with no significant relationship found in the remaining case (see Table 6.9). It is 
obvious from the results that session limits on campaign contributions clearly limits the 
activity of interest groups during the session. The limitation of contributions during the 
legislative session removes one aspect of the appearance of PACs being able to garner 
undue influence by giving a contribution during the legislative session.   
 
3. The Impact of Session Limits on Contributions Patterns  
The contribution patterns differed in states placing session limits on campaign 
contributions. A greater increase in contributions occurred surrounding both the primary and 
general election in states limiting all campaign contributions during legislative sessions, thus 
providing support for the third hypothesis. There was a 348% increase in campaign 
contributions during the two months leading up to the general election in the four states 
without limits on contributions during legislative sessions, compared to a 953% increase 
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prior to the election in states with limits on contributions during legislative sessions (see 
table 6.10). Furthermore, there was an average increase of 263% in campaign contributions 
prior to the primary in states without session limits compared to an increase of 351% in 
states with session limits.  
TABLE 6.10. ABOUT HERE 
 The difference in election contributions between states allowing session 
contributions and those not allowing session contributions provides some evidence that 
interest groups may shift their strategies when faced with session limits. Interest groups 
faced with legal restrictions when attempting to influence legislative outcomes employ 
alternative strategies to advance their agenda, such as influencing the outcome of the 
election. Additionally, some interest groups may be giving election contributions as a 
reward for past legislative support and in the effort to influence legislation in the next 
legislative session.  
 
4.  Legislative Sessions and Contribution Patterns 
 The results indicate interest groups are engaging in influencing behavior prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session in four of the nine states including Georgia and Utah that 
prohibit contributions during the legislative session, thus providing support for hypothesis 
four. Additionally, there is evidence that contributors are engaging in rewarding behavior at 
the completion of the legislative session, in the highly professional states of California, 
Illinois, and New York that allow contributions during the legislative session. However, 
there is no evidence that contributors are rewarding legislators in states that prohibit 
contributions during the legislative session. Additionally, there is evidence that interest 
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groups are engaging in influencing behavior in states with and without limits on 
contributions during the legislative session. However, the increase in contributions prior to 
the beginning of the session appears to be greater in states with session limits.  These 
findings provide evidence that interest groups are not just providing contributions to 
legislators supportive of their agenda, but are attempting to influence legislative vote 
outcomes. If interest groups only provide contributions to legislators who are predisposed to 
support their position, then the motivation to provide contributions prior to the beginning of 
the legislative session is much less, and the interest group may have an incentive to not 
provide a contribution that looks like it is attempting to influencing the outcome of a 
legislative vote. An examination of the pattern of campaign contributions, while not 
providing evidence of the success of contributions in changing legislative votes, does 
provide some evidence that contributors believe contributions are successful in affecting 
vote outcomes. 
 
4.1. Contribution patterns in states with session limits on contributions  
 Despite the hurdles interest groups face in a state with session limits, it is highly 
unlikely interest groups simply pack their bags, go home, and stop attempting to influence 
legislative outcomes. Therefore, in these states contributors have to implement new 
strategies of influencing election outcomes.  One potential strategy is to shift contributions 
to immediately before the legislative session begins.  
 In Utah, we see a spike in the number of contributions given just prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session in 2001 in the health care sector, thus providing support 
for hypothesis four (see Figures 6.0 and 6.1). Two weeks prior to the beginning of the 
  
 
 
116 
section there are 79 contributions given to legislators. In the week prior to the general 
election 96 contributions are given.  This is the only other week in the two years examined 
in which there are more contributions given than the 79 given two weeks prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session. Furthermore, 105 contributions occur in the two weeks 
prior to the beginning of the legislative session in 2001, which indicates PACs are likely 
employing an influencing strategy in which they are trying to shape legislation under 
consideration in the upcoming legislative session.  
FIGURES 6.0. and 6.1. ABOUT HERE 
 Contributions do not increase as greatly prior to the beginning of the 2002 Utah 
legislative session. Twenty-five contributions are during the month prior to the beginning of 
the legislative session. While this is not a high number of contributions, the largest increase 
in the number of contributions since prior to the beginning of the 2001 session occurs during 
the month prior to the 2002 session.  
Additionally, we find an average increase of 579% in the two weeks prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session in Utah, thus providing support for the fourth hypothesis. 
Only four contributions occur in the month following the legislative session resulting in on 
average a 28% decrease in contributions during the two weeks following the end of the 
session, therefore providing no support for a reward strategy and hypothesis five. 
 Contribution patterns found in the business sector were similar to what was found in 
the health and insurance sectors (see Figure 6.2). During the two weeks prior to the 
beginning of the 2001 legislative session, 63 contributions were given to legislators. 
Additionally, during the month prior to the beginning of the 2002 legislative session there 
  
 
 
117 
were 23 contributions. The largest number of contributions given in any one week during 
2001 and 2002 was 75, given two months prior to the election.   
FIGURE 6.2. ABOUT HERE 
 An examination of contribution patterns in the New Mexico House reveals little 
evidence of influencing or rewarding behavior in the business and labor sectors (see Figures 
6.3-6.5). However, there is slightly more evidence that influencing behavior is occurring in 
the health care sector and insurance sectors in the Senate, however, the increase did not 
attain statistical significance. The largest number of contributions given in one week across 
the two years is 26 which are given one month prior to the beginning of the legislative 
session. Additionally, there is no evidence that contributors in any sector in New Mexico are 
engaging in rewarding behavior. Furthermore, there is 42% decrease in contributions in the 
two weeks following the legislative session. 
FIGURES 6.3. to 6.5. ABOUT HERE 
Campaign contributions in Georgia were very similar to Utah. There is evidence that 
contributors are engaging in influencing behavior across, the, insurance, health care sector as 
well as the business and labor sectors. In the week prior to the beginning of the legislative 
session in 2001, contributors with interest in the insurance sector gave 45 contributions to 
legislators (see Figure 6.6). In 2002, when the Georgia insurance bill was considered, 
contributors gave 108 contributions in the week prior to the beginning of the legislative 
session and 320 contributions in the month prior to the beginning of the legislative session. 
In the month following the conclusion of the 2001 legislative session, contributors gave 29 
contributions while 57 contributions occurred in the month following the 2002 session.  
Furthermore, an analysis of HB 1492 reveals an 18% increase in contributions prior to the 
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beginning of the legislative session thus providing evidence to support hypothesis four. It 
appears that contributors in the insurance sector are providing contributions prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session in the hope of influencing policy outcomes during the 
legislative session. This finding also provides evidence that interest groups reformulate their 
strategies when facing a prohibition on contributions during the legislative session.  
FIGURE 6.6. ABOUT HERE 
Influencing behavior occurred in the business sector as well (see Figure 6.7). PACs 
gave 19 contributions during the week prior to the beginning of the 2001 legislative session. 
Additionally, PACs provided 63 contributions in the week prior to the beginning of the 2002 
legislative session. In the month following the 2001 legislative session only 22 contributions 
occurred with 17 contributions given in the month following the 2002 session.  Furthermore, 
there was a 167% increase in contributions in the two weeks prior to the legislative session, 
thus providing additional support for hypothesis four while a 54% decrease in contributions 
occurred after the session was complete providing evidence that contributors were not 
engaging in reward behavior. 
FIGURE 6.7. ABOUT HERE 
 Similar patterns occurred in the energy sector in Georgia. More groups appear to be 
providing contributions prior to the beginning of the session than at the conclusion of the 
legislative session (see Figure 6.8). Contributors gave 24 contributions in the week prior to 
the beginning of the 2001 legislative session with 82 contributions given in the week prior to 
the beginning of the 2002 legislative session. As in the previous cases, fewer contributions 
followed the legislative session. Only 24 contributions occurred in the month following the 
2001 session and only 24 contributions in the month following the 2002 legislative session. 
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Furthermore, a 217% increase in contributions occurred prior to the beginning of the 
legislative session while a 43% decreased occurred at the end of the legislative session.  
FIGURE 6.8. ABOUT HERE 
 
4.2. Contribution patterns in states without session limits on contributions  
 There is some evidence that contributors are rewarding legislators for what they did 
during the course of the legislative session even though they are able to provide 
contributions throughout the legislative session in California, Illinois and New York.  There 
is also evidence that contributors are attempting to influence legislators prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session in California and Kentucky. In California, there was a 
significant increase in contribution activity during the legislative session (see table 6.2). 
Additionally, there is on average a 154% increase in contributions in the two weeks 
following the end of the legislative session. This finding provides evidence that 
contributions increased at the end of the legislative session as a reward for support during 
the legislative session and in particular what occurred at the end of the legislative session 
when the majority of legislation tends to be passed.  
 In the health care and insurance sectors the week immediately following the 
legislative session was found to be significant in explaining contributions. In fact, each of 
the two weeks following the end of the legislative session was significant in explaining 
campaign contributions (see Figures 6.9 and 6.10). In the case of the California, minimum 
wage bill 148 contributions were given in the two weeks following the end of the legislative 
session in 2001, and 84 contributions were given in the two weeks following the 2002 
legislative session (see Figure 6.11). 
FIGURES 6.9 TO 6.11. ABOUT HERE 
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 The California minimum wage bill saw 95 contributions given during the week prior 
to the beginning of the legislative session. Additionally, a 260% increase in contributions 
occurred prior to the beginning of the legislative session. The California worker’s 
compensation bill saw 131 contributions given in the week prior to the beginning of the 
2002 legislative session, and a 233% increase in contributions in the two weeks prior to the 
beginning of the legislative session. The California health care bill saw 85 contributions 
given in the week prior to the beginning of the legislative session, and a 201% increase in 
contributions.     
 There is also some evidence in Illinois that PACs are giving contributions following 
the legislative session as a reward for legislative vote outcomes. There was a significant 
increase in contributions during the two weeks following the legislative session in two out of 
the three cases in Illinois (see Figures 6.12-6.14). The medical leave and minimum wage 
legislative saw a 143% increase in contributions at the end of the legislative session. On the 
other hand, a decrease in contributions occurred prior to the beginning of the legislative 
session in all three cases. 
FIGURES 6.12. TO 6.14. ABOUT HERE 
 In New York there is no evidence that contributors are attempting to influencing 
legislation prior to the beginning of the session, however, there is evidence that PACs are 
rewarding legislators upon completion of the session. A 153% percent increase in 
contribution occurred among contributors concerned with the legislation on unemployment 
benefits, and a 238% increase occurred in the two weeks after the end of the session among 
contributors interested in the minimum wage legislation. 
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 Reward behavior occurred in California, Illinois, and New York, which are the three 
most professional states in the sample, and three of the four states that allow contributions 
during the legislative session.  Legislators in highly professional states may likely serve in 
the legislature longer than members in amateur legislatures, therefore, PACs have to develop 
long-term strategies that reward supporters of their position. It does not make sense to give a 
contribution following a legislative vote if the member will not be around in the future when 
additional legislation is considered. However, it is important to reward those legislators that 
have the potential to influence legislative outcomes in the future.  
FIGURES 6.15. TO 6.18. ABOUT HERE 
 
5.  States which Place Limits on Campaign Contributions during Sessions 
 South Carolina and Wisconsin do not prohibit all contributions during the legislative 
session, however, they do prohibit contributions by lobbyist during legislative sessions. Of 
the four bills examined in the two states, three were found not significant in explaining 
contribution patterns (see Tables 6.11 and 6.12). The health insurance task force bill in 
South Carolina was the only bill found to exert a significant and positive influence on the 
number of contributions (see Table 6.11), thus providing support for hypothesis two. An 
increase of 342% in contributions occurred during the vote event period surrounding the 
consideration of the legislation that established a task force to conduct a comprehensive 
review of health insurance mandates. Conversely, there is no indication that contributors in 
South Carolina are increasing contributions just prior to the beginning of the legislative 
session or immediately following the conclusion of the legislative session as the beginning 
and end of session variables are insignificant in all cases (see Figures 6.19-6.21). 
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Contributors are giving contributions throughout the legislative session with the session 
resulting in a positive increase on contributions in all three cases and a significant increase 
on the minimum wage and right to work legislation. On average, there was a 168% increase 
in contributions during the legislative session across the two significant pieces of legislation. 
These findings indicate that contributors increase their activity during the legislative session, 
thus providing support for hypothesis two that interest groups are attempting to influence the 
outcome of legislative votes. 
TABLES 6.11. AND 6.12. ABOUT HERE 
FIGURES 6.19 TO 6.21. ABOUT HERE 
 
6. Legislative Professionalism and Campaign Contributions 
 An additional examination of the findings appears to indicate a relationship between 
legislative professionalism and campaign contributions. Four of the nine states in the sample 
are in the top quarter of states on Squire’s (1992) measure of legislative professionalism.14 
In those four states there was on average a 209% increase in campaign contributions prior to 
the general election. In contrast, four of the states are in the bottom quarter of Squire’s 
ranking,15 and in those states there was on average a 906% increase in contributions prior to 
the general election (see Table 6.13). Furthermore, an examination of the primaries reveal 
similar results with a 191% increase in contributions in those states considered the most 
professional, and a 376% increase in contributions in those states at the low end of the 
professionalism ranking, 
                                                 
14
 Squire (1992) ranks New York 1st, California 3rd, Illinois 8th, and Wisconsin 12th on his index of 
professionalism. 
15
 Squire (1992) ranks Georgia 39th, Kentucky 44th, New Mexico 45th, and Utah 47th on his index of 
professionalism. 
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TABLE 6.13. ABOUT HERE 
 From these findings it appears that PACs are targeting the elections more in the 
amateur legislatures than in more professional legislatures. This may be the product of the 
fact that the legislatures in the more professional states have a more expansive agendas than 
is the case in the amateur legislatures, and therefore they are more likely to target legislation 
in the professional legislature. 
 Three out of the four states in the top quarter of legislative professionalism have no 
limits on contributions given during legislative sessions, and Wisconsin only bans 
contributions from lobbyists (see Table 6.14). In states that allow any contributions during 
the legislative session, we see on average an increase of 348% in the number of 
contributions given. However in those states that fully ban contributions during a legislative 
session, we see on average a 953% increase in the number of contributions given prior to the 
general elections. This indicates the possibility that interest groups shift their contributions 
to the election when faced with session limits. Additionally, in those states which allow 
contributions during the legislative session, PACs can target the legislation directly instead 
of shifting contributions to just prior to the beginning or end of the session or to the election.  
TABLE 6.14. ABOUT HERE 
 Three out of four of the states, at the bottom quarter of the professionalism scale, ban 
contributions during the legislative session. Only Kentucky allows contributions during the 
legislative session, therefore given the legal restraints faced by PACs in these states, it is 
likely they will shift their contribution patterns, with more contributions given during the 
course of the elections and supporting hypothesis three.  
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7. Conclusion 
 The results presented in this chapter reveal that contributions consistently increase 
close to the general and primary election across all states in the sample. Additionally, in six 
out of nine states the general election is the most important factor in explaining campaign 
contributions, with the primary being the most important factor in Illinois and South 
Carolina and the beginning of the legislative session being the most important in California. 
This provides support for hypothesis one that the election will be the most important factor 
in explaining contributions. These findings are consistent with expectations since it is 
impossible to determine if contributions given prior to the election are given particularistic 
or universalistic. 
 The findings presented in this chapter also provide evidence that contributors attempt 
to influence legislative outcomes, and this supports hypothesis two. Significant increases in 
contributions occur close to legislative votes in states where contributors are not prohibited 
from giving by law. Additionally, increases in legislative activity are significant in 
explaining contributions when session limits are not in place, thus providing additional 
support for hypothesis two. Third, contributions increase by 348% close to the general 
election in states that do not prohibit contributions during the legislative session in 
comparison to a 953% increase in states that prohibit contributions during the session. These 
findings provide support for hypothesis three thus indicating that interest group activity 
close to the general election is greater in states that prohibit contributions during the 
legislative session. Furthermore, these findings provide additional evidence that session 
limits do not limit money going to legislators, but merely shift when it is being given. 
Fourth, the results for Utah and Georgia provide evidence that interest groups attempt to 
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influence policy outcomes even when faced with session limits by shifting their 
contributions to just prior to the beginning of the legislative session thus supporting 
hypothesis four. Finally, there is no evidence to support hypothesis five. Reward behavior at 
the end of the session was not found in the states with session limits. Additionally, reward 
behavior was only found in the highly professional states of California, Illinois and New 
York. This finding may indicate that interest groups are more likely to reward members in 
professional legislature were members are more likely to serve for more years thus making it 
important to establish long term relationships with legislators. 
The findings in this chapter clearly reveal that interest groups in state legislatures are 
attempting to influence policy outcomes. The evidence overwhelmingly supports hypothesis 
two, that interest groups are attempting to influencing policy outcomes, despite the fact that 
the measurement employed in this study clearly underestimates the number of particularistic 
contributors.  The results presented in this chapter provide insight into how to write more 
effective campaign finance laws to remove the undue influence of money from politics. In 
the next chapter I discuss the implications of the findings for the understanding of the 
behavior of interest groups and how that understanding affects future reform efforts. 
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Table 6.0.  General and Primary Election Contribution Increases 
State Bill Subject General 
Election 
Increase In 
Contributions 
Primary 
Election 
Increase in 
Contributions 
California S.B. 604 Health Care 155% 195% 
California A.B. 2242 Minimum Wage 161% 148% 
California S.B. 71 Worker’s Compensation 158% 153% 
Georgia H.B. 1568 Natural Gas 397% 325% 
Georgia H.B. 1492 Insurance Bill 279% 326% 
Georgia S.B. 14 Minimum Wage 464% 381% 
Illinois H.B. 2487 Medical Leave 193% 224% 
Illinois H.B. 4540 Minimum Wage 193% 213% 
Illinois S.B. 1341 Insurance 203% 241% 
Kentucky H.B. 132 Black Lung 760% 434% 
Kentucky H.B.348 Worker’s Compensation 773% 464% 
New 
Mexico 
H.B. 62 Employee Protection 1538% 647% 
New 
Mexico 
S.B. 439 Health Care Not 
Significant 
299% 
New 
Mexico 
H.J.R 8 Minimum Wage 1570% 662% 
New York A.B. 11723 Senate Women’s health care 204% 125% 
New York A.B. 11723 
(House) 
House Women’s health care 199% 173% 
New York A.B. 11624 Unemployment benefits 337% 276% 
New York A.B. 5132 Minimum Wage 337% 276% 
South 
Carolina 
H.B. 4583 Health insurance task force 461% 639% 
South 
Carolina 
H.B. 3289 Minimum wage 479% 405% 
South 
Carolina 
H.B. 3142 Right to work 479% 412% 
Utah H.B. 105 Health insurance 845% 187% 
Utah S.B. 138 Minimum wage 1121% 154% 
Utah H.B. 238 Tobacco tax 806% 179% 
Wisconsin S.B. 251 Worker’s compensation 212% 160% 
Averages   514% 308% 
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Table 6.1. Contributions Patterns in States without Limits on Session Contributions 
State Bill Reference in 
Paper 
Legislative 
Event 
Contributions 
During the 
Legislative 
Session 
California S.B. 604 Health Care 154% Increase Not 
Significant 
California A.B. 2242 Minimum Wage 117% Increase 115% 
Increase 
California S.B. 71 Worker’s 
Compensation 
Not Significant 117% 
Increase 
Illinois H.B. 2487 Medical Leave 117% Increase 80% 
Decrease 
Illinois H.B. 4540 Minimum Wage Not Significant 84% 
Decrease 
Illinois S.B. 1341 Insurance Not Significant 68% 
Decrease 
Kentucky H.B. 132 Black Lung 11% Decrease 287% 
Decrease 
Kentucky H.B.348 Worker’s 
Compensation 
260% Increase 29% 
Decrease 
New York A.B. 11723 
(Senate) 
Senate women’s 
health care 
126% Increase 172% 
Increase 
New York A.B. 11723 
(House) 
House women’s 
health care 
164% Increase 132% 
Increase 
New York A.B. 11624 Unemployment 
benefits 
218% Increase 253% 
Increase 
New York A.B. 5132 Minimum Wage Not Significant 275% 
Increase 
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Table 6.2. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the California 
Senate: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 SB604 (Health 
Care)  
SB71 (Worker’s 
Compensation)  
AB2242 (Minimum 
Wage)  
Vote Event .430* 
(.055) 
.081 
(.057) 
.158* 
(.057) 
General 
Election 
.436* 
(.071) 
.454* 
(.061) 
.474* 
(.079) 
Primary 
Election 
.670* 
(.062) 
.425* 
(.054) 
.390* 
(.071) 
Session .046 
(.057) 
.158* 
(.048) 
.140* 
(.062) 
Beginning of 
Session 
.698* 
(.119) 
.848* 
(.098) 
.955* 
(.121) 
End of 
Session 
.728* 
(.082) 
.651* 
(.072) 
.531* 
(.098) 
N 80075 98037 56997 
Number of 
PACs  
770 943 549 
Log-
likelihood  
-11056 -14636 -8840 
Notes: 
Statistical 
significance 
at the .05 
level 
indicated 
by* 
Standard 
errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.3. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Illinois 
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 HB 2487 (Medical 
Leave) 
SB 1341 
(Insurance) 
HB 4540 
(Minimum 
Wage) 
Vote Event .158* 
(.066) 
.110 
(.089) 
.015 
(.060) 
General Election .659* 
(.049) 
.707* 
(.056) 
.659* 
(.049) 
Primary Election .804* 
(.055) 
.878* 
(.069) 
.757* 
(.054) 
Session -.219* 
(.043) 
-.390* 
(.053) 
-.177* 
(.040) 
Beginning of Session -.785* 
(.139) 
-767* 
(.160) 
-.785* 
(.139) 
End of Session .356* 
(.073) 
.105 
(.097) 
.356* 
(.073) 
N 61305 66510 61305 
Number of PACs  594 642 594 
Log-likelihood  -13809 -10197 -13812 
Notes: Statistical 
significance at the .05 
level indicated by* 
Standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.4. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Kentucky 
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 HB 132 (Black Lung) HB 348 (Worker’s 
Compensation) 
Vote Event -2.21* 
(1.02) 
.955* 
(.303) 
General Election 2.03* 
(.100) 
2.05* 
(.100) 
Primary Election 1.47* 
(.133) 
1.53* 
(.133) 
Session -1.25* 
(.214) 
-1.78* 
(.236) 
Beginning of Session 1.44* 
(.209) 
.871* 
(.300) 
End of Session -.993* 
(.293) 
-1.03* 
(.292) 
N 10714 10714 
Number of PACs  103 103 
Log-likelihood  -1937 -1937 
Notes: Statistical significance 
at the .05 level indicated by* 
Standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.5. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the New York: 
Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 AB 11723 
(Senate – 
Women’s 
Health Care) 
AB 11723 
(House – 
Women’s 
Health Care) 
AB 11624 
(House – 
Unemployment 
Benefits) 
AB 5132 
(House _ 
Minimum 
Wage) 
Vote Event .234** 
(.077) 
.496** 
(.099) 
.779** 
(.100) 
-.072 
(.108) 
General 
Election 
.711** 
(.094) 
.690** 
(.116) 
1.22** 
(.140) 
1.22** 
(.140) 
Primary 
Election 
.219** 
(.099) 
.546** 
(.116) 
1.02** 
(.139) 
1.02** 
(.139) 
Session .543** 
(.085) 
.275** 
(.108) 
.928** 
(.142) 
1.01** 
(.142) 
Beginning of 
Session 
-.115 
(.208) 
.256 
(.233) 
-.509 
(.468) 
-.505 
(.468) 
End of 
Session 
.101 
(.148) 
.123 
(.181) 
.423* 
(.224) 
.867** 
(.215) 
N 84056  41887 35254 35254 
Number of 
PACs  
812  403 339 339 
Log-
likelihood  
-9927 -4753 -3761 -3786 
Notes: 
Statistical 
significance 
at the .05 
level 
indicated 
by** 
Statistical 
significance 
at the .1 
level 
indicated by 
* 
Standard 
errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.6. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the New 
Mexico Senate: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 
 
SB 439 (Health Care) HB 62 
(Employee 
Protection)  
HJR 8 
(Minimum 
Wage) 
General Election -.280 
(.351) 
2.73** 
(.115) 
2.75** 
(.122) 
Primary Election 1.09** 
(.201) 
1.87** 
(.136) 
1.89** 
(.143) 
Session -14.28 
(292.51) 
-1.88** 
(.508) 
-2.06** 
(.585) 
Beginning of Session .275 
(.393) 
-1.72* 
(1.00) 
-1.20* 
(.714) 
End of Session -.572 
(.588) 
-.926** 
(.585) 
-1.22** 
(.714) 
N 7696 11327 9663 
Number of PACs  74 110 94 
Log-likelihood  -595 -1595 -1447 
Notes: Statistical 
significance at the .05 
level indicated by** 
Statistical significance 
at the .1 level indicated 
by * 
Standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.7. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Utah House: 
Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 HB 105 (Health 
Insurance) 
HB 238 
(Tobacco Tax) 
SB 138 
(Minimum 
Wage) 
General Election 2.13** 
(.105) 
2.09** 
(.104) 
2.42** 
(.141) 
Primary Election .628** 
(.162) 
.580** 
(.161) 
.433* 
(.253) 
Session -1.02** 
(.261) 
-2.39** 
(.505) 
-1.08** 
(.393) 
Beginning of Session 1.65** 
(.154) 
1.60** 
(.152) 
1.98** 
(.196) 
End of Session -1.08** 
(.505) 
-1.13** 
(.505) 
-1.71* 
(1.01) 
N 10406 10405 8836 
Number of PACs  101 101 85 
Log-likelihood  -1896 -1880 -1085 
Notes: Statistical 
significance at the .05 
level indicated by** 
Statistical significance 
at the .1 level indicated 
by * 
Standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.8. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Georgia 
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 HB 1568 (Natural Gas) HB 1492 
(Insurance Bill)  
SB 14 
(Minimum 
Wage) 
General Election 1.38** 
(.076) 
1.03** 
(.057) 
1.53** 
(.081) 
Primary Election 1.18** 
(.081) 
1.18** 
(.055) 
1.34** 
(.086) 
Session -1.45** 
(.145) 
-1.73** 
(.110) 
-1.32** 
(.153) 
Beginning of Session .773** 
(.146) 
.499** 
(.109) 
.513** 
(.177) 
End of Session -.843** 
(.254) 
-1.30** 
(.215) 
-.616** 
(.256) 
N 30261 63023 28715 
Number of PACs  294 607 280 
Log-likelihood  -3926 -7683 -3502 
Notes: Statistical 
significance at the .05 
level indicated by** 
Statistical significance 
at the .1 level indicated 
by * 
Standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.9. Impact of Legislative Session in States with Contribution Restrictions during 
Legislative Sessions 
State Bill Subject Legislative Session 
Georgia H.B. 1568 Natural Gas 23% Decrease 
Georgia H.B. 1492 Insurance 18% Decrease 
Georgia S.B. 14 Minimum Wage 27% Decrease 
New Mexico H.B. 62 Employee 
Protection 
15% Decrease 
New Mexico S.B. 439 Health Care Not Significant 
New Mexico H.J.R. 8 Minimum Wage 13% Decrease 
Utah H.B. 105 Health Insurance 36% Decrease 
Utah S.B. 138 Minimum Wage 34% Decrease 
Utah H.B. 238 Tobacco Tax 9% Decrease 
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Table 6.10. Average Increase in Campaign Contributions 
States 
Without 
Session 
Limits 
General 
Election 
Average 
Increase 
Primary 
Election 
Average 
Increase 
States With 
Session 
Limits 
General 
Election 
Average 
Increase 
Primary 
Election 
Average 
Increase 
California 158% 165% Georgia 380% 344% 
Kentucky 767% 449% New Mexico 1554% 536% 
Illinois 196% 226% Utah 924% 173% 
New York 269% 213%    
Average 348% 263%  953% 351% 
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Table 6.11. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the South 
Carolina House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 HB 4583 (Health 
Insurance Task Force) 
HB 3289 
(Minimum 
Wage) 
HB 3142 (Right 
to Work)  
Vote Event 1.13* 
(.168) 
-.679* 
(.237) 
-.657* 
(.247) 
General Election 1.53* 
(.145) 
1.57* 
(.140) 
1.57* 
(.140) 
Primary Election 1.85* 
(.143) 
1.40* 
(.126) 
1.42* 
(.126) 
Session .064 
(.152) 
.526* 
(.134) 
.509* 
(.133) 
Beginning of Session -.006 
(.391) 
.086 
(.366) 
.086 
(.366) 
End of Session .091 
(.249) 
.221 
(.267) 
.209 
(.267) 
N 18720 21944 21944 
Number of PACs  180 211 211 
Log-likelihood  -1837 -1941 -1942 
Notes: Statistical 
significance at the .05 
level indicated by* 
Standard errors are in 
parentheses 
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Table 6.12. Effects of Vote Events and Elections on Weekly Contributions in the Wisconsin 
House: Contributor Fixed-Effects Model 
 SB 251 (Worker’s Compensation) 
Vote Event -14.47 
(419.17) 
General Election .752* 
(.139) 
Primary Election .470* 
(.145) 
Session -1.29* 
(.151) 
Beginning of Session -15.75 
(784.21) 
End of Session .122 
(.308) 
N 6761 
Number of PACs   65 
Log-likelihood  -1233 
Notes: Statistical significance at the .05 
level indicated by* 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
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Table 6.13. Contribution Increases by Rank of Professionalism 
Squire’s Rank of 
Professionalism 
State General Election Primary 
1 New York 269% 213% 
3 California 158% 165% 
8 Illinois 196% 226% 
12 Wisconsin 212% 160% 
28 South Carolina 473% 485% 
39 Georgia 380% 344% 
44 Kentucky 767% 449% 
45 New Mexico 1554% 536% 
47 Utah 924% 173% 
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Table 6.14. Contribution Increases by Rank of Professionalism 
Squire’s Rank of 
Professionalism 
State Session 
Limits 
General 
Election 
Primary 
1 New York No 269% 213% 
3 California No 158% 165% 
8 Illinois No 196% 226% 
12 Wisconsin Lobbyist 
Only 
212% 160% 
28 South Carolina Lobbyist 
Only 
473% 485% 
39 Georgia Yes 380% 344% 
44 Kentucky No 767% 449% 
45 New Mexico Yes 1554% 536% 
47 Utah Yes 924% 173% 
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Figure 6.0. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 105 – Health Insurance) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 78 
            HB 105 Achieved Final Passage in Week 57 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 9 
 2002 Session Begin in Week 55 and Ends Week 62 
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Figure 6.1. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 238 – Tobacco Tax) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 78 
            HB 238 Achieved Final Passage in Week 61 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 9 
 2002 Session Begin in Week 55 and Ends Week 62 
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Figure 6.2. Utah House Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 138 – Minimum Wage) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 78 
            SB 138 Achieved Final Passage in Week 9 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 9 
 2002 Session Begin in Week 55 and Ends Week 62 
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Figure 6.3. New Mexico Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (SB439 – Health Care) 
 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 
           Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002 
           General Election Occurred in Week 97 
           Primary Occurred in Week 75  
           SB 439 Achieved Final Passage in Week 10 
           2001 Session begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 11 
           2002 Session begin in Week 55 and ended in Week 59 
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Figure 6.4. New Mexico House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 62 – Employee 
Protection) 
 
 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 
           Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002 
           General Election Occurred in Week 97 
           Primary Occurred in Week 75  
           HB 16 Final Passage Vote in Week 7 
           2001 Session begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 11 
           2002 Session begin in Week 55 and ended in Week 59 
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Figure 6.5. New Mexico House Campaign Contributions by Week (HJR 8 – Minimum 
Wage) 
 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 
           Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002 
           General Election Occurred in Week 97 
           Primary Occurred in Week 75  
           HJR 8 Achieved Final Passage in Week 58 
           2001 Session begin in Week 3 and ended in Week 11 
           2002 Session begin in Week 55 and ended in Week 59 
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Figure 6.6. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 1492 - Insurance) 
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 
           Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002 
           General Election Occurred in Week 97 
           Primary Occurred in Week 86 
           HB 1492 Achieved Final Passage in Week 65 
           2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 12 
           2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 67 
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Figure 6.7. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 14 – Minimum Wage) 
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 
           Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002 
           General Election Occurred in Week 97 
           Primary Occurred in Week 86 
           SB 14 Achieved Final Passage in Week 11 
           2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 12 
           2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 67 
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Figure 6.8. Georgia House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 1568 – Natural Gas) 
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Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 
           Weeks 2 to 104 are for 2002 
           General Election Occurred in Week 97 
           Primary Occurred in Week 86 
           HB 1568 Achieved Final Passage in Week 64 
           2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 12 
           2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 67 
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Figure 6.9. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 71 – Worker’s 
Compensation) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
General Election Occurred in Week 97 
Primary Occurred in Week 62 
SB 71 passed Senate in Week 20 
2001 Session Begin in Week 1 and Ended in Week 37 
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and Ended in Week 87 
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Figure 6.10. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 604 – Health Care) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 62 
            SB 604 Achieved Final Passage in Week 23 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 1 and ended in week 37 
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended in week 87 
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Figure 6.11. California Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 2242 – Minimum 
Wage) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
General Election Occurred in Week 97 
Primary Occurred in Week 62 
AB 2242 Failed to Pass Senate and Went to the Inactive File in Week 87 
2001 Session Begin in Week 1 and Ended in Week 37 
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and Ended in Week 87 
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Figure 6.12. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 4540 – Minimum Wage) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 64 
            HB 4540 Achieved Final Passage in Week 66 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 22 
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended in week 74 
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Figure 6.13. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week (SB 1341 - Insurance) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 64 
            SB 1341 Achieved Final Passage in Week 18  
 2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 22 
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended in week 74 
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Figure 6.14. Illinois House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 2487 – Medical Leave) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 64 
            HB 2487 Achieved Final Passage in Week 13 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended in week 22 
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended in week 74 
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Figure 6.15. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 5132 – Minimum 
Wage) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 89 
            AB 5132 Achieved Final Passage in Week 12 
 2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49  
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 77 
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Figure 6.16. New York Senate Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 11723 – Women’s 
Health Care) 
 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 89 
            AB 11723 Achieved Final Passage in Week 76 
 2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49  
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 77 
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Figure 6.17. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 11624 – 
Unemployment Benefits) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 89 
            AB 11624 Achieved Final Passage in Week 76 
 2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49  
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 77 
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Figure 6.18. New York House Campaign Contributions by Week (AB 11723 – Women’s 
Health Care) 
 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 89 
            AB 11723 Achieved Final Passage in Week 76 
 2001 Session begin in Week 1 and ended in week 49  
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended in week 77 
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Figure 6.19. South Carolina House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 3142 – Right to 
Work) 
 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 76 
            HB 3142 Achieved Final Passage in Week 7 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended week 23  
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended week 75 
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Figure 6.20. South Carolina House Campaign Contributions by Week (HB 3289 – Minimum 
Wage) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 76 
            HB 3289 Achieved Final Passage in Week 8 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended week 23  
2002 Session Begin in Week 54 and ended week 75 
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Figure 6.21. South Carolina House Contributions by Week (HB 4583 – Health Insurance 
Task Force) 
 
Notes: Weeks 1 to 52 are for 2001 and Weeks 53 to 104 is for 2002 
            General Election Occurred in Week 97 
            Primary Occurred in Week 76 
            HB 4583 Achieved Final Passage in Week 64 
 2001 Session Begin in Week 2 and ended week 23  
2002 Session Begin in Week 53 and ended week 75 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Discussion 
 
 The findings presented in this dissertation have provided an increased understanding 
of the motivation of PACs providing campaign contributions to legislators. It is apparent 
from the findings that interest groups are behaving in a manner that leads to the conclusion 
that they believe money is useful in securing a desired legislative outcome. While the results 
presented here indicate that proximity to the general election and the primary are 
consistently the most important factors in explaining patterns of campaign contributions, it 
remains uncertain as to the portion of the increase in contributions prior to the election that 
can be contributed to universalistic contributors, and the portion that are contributed to 
particularistic contributors. See tables 7.0 and 7.1 for a summary of the results presented in 
chapter six. 
TABLES 7.0. and 7.1. ABOUT HERE 
 The research presented in this dissertation does not prove that contributors are 
gaining influence through providing contributions. However, the findings offer significant 
insight into the actions of contributors. It is clear from this dissertation that contributors are 
attempting to influence the outcome of elections and legislative votes. This dissertation 
provides empirical evidence of particularistic behavior of contributors in state legislatures. 
Stratmann (1998) found an increase of contribution surrounding the general election, 
primary election and important legislative events in Congress. Furthermore, he found that 
the greatest increase in contributions occurred surrounding the general elections and he 
concluded that PACs use contributions to prevent legislators from reneging on quid pro quo 
agreements. The findings presented in this study expand the findings of Stratmann to the 
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state level.  Consistent with the findings of Stratmann (1998) the general election was 
consistently the largest explanation of contributions in state legislators. Additionally, the 
findings of this dissertation reveal that PACs are behaving at the state level in a manner 
similar to the national level in that PACs at the state level are also using contributions to 
prevent legislators from reneging of quid pro quo agreements.  
 In addition to confirming the findings of Stratmann (1998) at the national level, the 
state level analysis deepens our understanding of PAC behavior. The state level analysis 
presented in this dissertation upholds the findings of Stratmann (1998) even when faced with 
session limits on contributions. PACs provide contributions prior to the beginning of the 
legislative session in states with session limits to prevent legislators from reneging on quid 
pro quo agreements.  The findings presented in this research combined with the research at 
the national level provides a fuller understanding of the actions of PACs that are attempting 
to influence policy outcomes at all levels of government.  
 Given the incentives contributors have to hide the true intentions of donations, it is 
even more remarkable that there is direct evidence of PACs attempting to influence the 
legislative process. In 32% of all cases examined in this study, there was direct evidence of 
PACs attempting to influence the outcome of a legislative vote. If we remove the states that 
prohibit all contributions during a legislative session, the number jumps to 50%, therefore 
there is direct evidence that in half the cases interest groups were attempting to influence the 
outcome of legislative votes.   
 Interest groups attempt to influence legislative outcomes by providing a contribution 
close to a legislative vote, or at the beginning of the legislative session with the later 
strategy, likely employed in cases were it is not legally permissible to give close to the 
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legislative vote. In 56% of the cases in this study contributors were engaged in influencing 
behavior by providing a contribution close to a legislative vote or at the beginning of the 
legislative session. Furthermore, there is evidence that contributors in states that limit 
contributions during sessions have merely changed their strategy to account for this hurdle, 
but are not removed from the political process as many reforms attempted.  
 The results reported strongly indicate that campaign contribution patterns are 
strongly influence by the structure and laws of the system of which they are part. When 
examining contributions patterns across legislation in different economic sectors within the 
same state, there are very similar patterns of contributions. While in some states we see that 
one piece of legislation is significant in explaining contribution patterns while another in the 
same state is not significant, the general pattern of contributions across both sectors tend to 
be similar. 
 The findings presented in this dissertation are at the heart of the debate of 
representation in a democratic society.  The basic principle of a democratic society is 
majority rule, therefore, if policy outcomes are the will of the majority then understanding 
interest group activity is not important as policy outcomes are what the majority desired. 
However, understanding interest group activities is much more important when it results in 
policy outcomes that are against the will of the majority.  Campaign finance reforms are 
often efforts to insure the will of the majority is not overrode by a minority with the ability 
to bring about an anti-majority outcome through the giving of money and other favors to 
political decision makers.  On the other hand, a democratic society has a responsibility to 
protect the rights of those in the minority, thus creating a major dilemma for democracy. 
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Interest group activity that results in policy outcomes against the will of the majority may 
not necessarily be bad for democracy, but may actually protect the rights of minority groups.  
 Freedom of speech and expression are also important components of a democratic 
society. Citizens in a democracy should have the opportunity to have their beliefs heard, 
however, the opportunity to have your beliefs heard differs across individuals of different 
backgrounds. Given the inequality of access to the political system across citizens, campaign 
finance has to balance the freedom of speech rights of groups with money with the rights of 
those groups that may not enjoy the same access. Additionally, interest groups also give a 
voice to the views of citizens that they would not otherwise have if they were trying to 
influence government individually.  Reformers, therefore, have to exercise caution that 
efforts to remove the influence of interest groups from the political process may have the 
unintended consequence of diminishing even further the average citizens influence on policy 
outcomes and may shift the influence to wealthy individuals that have the power and 
influence to affect policy outcomes independently of interest groups.  
 Legitimacy is another important component of a democratic society. The ability of 
leaders to govern is centered on citizens recognizing their right to govern. Perceptions are 
often as important as reality when it comes to the legitimacy of government. The appearance 
of corruption is often as damaging to a government as actual corruption. Campaign finance 
reforms do not always lessen corruption, but the perception that they make a difference is 
important in restoring trust in government. For example, most states have placed limits on 
contribution amounts that individuals and interest groups can give. Contributors have often 
found loopholes in the law that allows them to circumvent the law, however, the appearance 
of corruption would be even greater if contributors were seen giving millions of dollars to 
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candidates. Session limits also have the same impact of reducing the appearance of 
corruption. Contributors giving contributions just prior to a major legislative vote results in a 
heighten level of mistrust among citizens even if the contribution had no impact on the 
decision made by the legislator. Session limits, therefore, serve to decrease the perception of 
corruption and thus are beneficial to democracy.  
 
1. The Effectiveness of Campaign Finance Reform 
As discussed previously, many efforts have attempted to reform the campaign 
finance system.  Most of the efforts have done little to remove money from the political 
system although in some cases they have served to remove the appearance of corruption 
from the political system. In this dissertation I have focused on the effectiveness of session 
limits in removing the influence of money from politics. These attempts have not been 
successful in removing the influence of money from the political system, but have instead 
only served to change the strategy employed by interest groups. It appears that contributors, 
when faced with session limits, merely shift their contributions to just before the session 
begins in the effort to influence legislation during the session.  
This leaves the important question of what campaign finance reforms would be the 
most effective in removing the undue influence of money from politics. It is obvious from 
the research that session limits do not achieve the intended goal of removing the undue 
influence of money from politics, therefore one must look elsewhere to answer that question. 
Limits on contributions have proven in the past not to be effective, as loopholes, which have 
allowed bundling and soft money, have allowed interest groups to get donations to 
candidates despite the contribution limit. However, even though session limits may not 
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prevent contributors from giving money they may still serve the important purpose of 
reducing the appearance of corruption and therefore helping to restore trust of citizens in 
government. 
Public financing of campaigns is one of the few ways to remove the undue influence 
of money from the legislative process.  However, public financing is unlikely to remove 
completely the influence of money from the election process.  While candidates would be 
prohibited from receiving any outside money, there is still the possibility that independent 
groups would conduct their own media campaigns to elect or defeat a certain candidate. In 
order to remove money from elections, it will be necessary to provide public funding in 
conjunction with a ban on outside spending. However, even without the ban on independent 
expenditures, a movement toward public financing would diminish the influence of money 
in the legislative process, since interest groups could not provide money directly to 
legislators. The impact of an independent expenditure provided by a PAC during the course 
of election is not as likely to be as effective in influencing legislative outcomes as a 
contribution given during the legislative session or in close proximity to the legislative 
session. 
The only other potential alternative to public financing to diminish the influence of 
money in politics is to lessen the role of government. If the scope of government is limited, 
then the need to influence legislative outcomes is diminished. In highly professional states 
with broad political agendas, interest groups appear to be much more active in attempting to 
influence legislative outcomes. On the other hand, in less professional states PACs seem to 
be targeting the elections more. These findings provide some evidence that one way of 
lessening the influence money out of politics is to lessen the scope of government. However, 
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this is unlikely to happen any time soon. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that the public 
will be willing to embrace a system of public financing to remove the influence of money 
from politics.  
 
2. Limitations of this Research and the Direction for Future Research 
 The research presented here examines only a very small slice of the legislation 
considered in state legislatures every year. Additional research needs to examine legislation 
on a broader array of topics. Furthermore, this research needs to look at the contribution 
patterns that surround legislation across other states as well. 
   The primary focus of this research has been on the actions of contributors and when 
they choose to provide campaign contributions to legislators. However, this research is 
unable to address the question of how effective those contributions are in changing 
legislative votes to the political action committee’s position. From this research we can infer 
that interest groups would not be giving contributions if they could not influence legislative 
outcomes however, we cannot empirically demonstrate that contributions are successful in 
achieving their intended goals. 
 Future research needs to attempt to identify when and if contributions are successful 
in changing a legislator’s vote. A possible approach in attempting to answer this question is 
to examine voting patterns of legislators on previous similar issues and to identify those 
cases when the legislator votes against his or her expected position. Along with future 
research, this dissertation will provide us with a fuller understanding of the role of money in  
politics and the direction for future reform efforts. 
 
Copyright ©David W. Prince 2006 
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Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws 
State Session Limit 
on 
Contributions  
Individual Limit PAC Limit Corporate 
Contribution 
Limits 
California No $20,000  
(Governor) 
 $5,000 (State Wide 
Office) 
 $3000 (Non State Wide 
Candidates) 
Small 
Contributor 
Committees: 
$21,200(gube
rnatorial 
candidate) 
$10,600(other 
statewide 
candidate) 
$6,400(legisla
tive 
candidate) 
Regular 
PACs: 
$21,200 
(gubernatorial 
candidate) 
$5,300(other 
statewide 
candidate) 
$3,200(legisla
tive 
candidate) 
 
$20,000 
(Gubernatoria
l Candidate) 
$5,000 (Other 
State Wide 
Office) 
$3,000 
(Legislative 
candidate) 
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Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued) 
State Session Limit 
on 
Contributions  
Individual Limit 
 
PAC Limit Corporate 
Contribution 
Limits 
Georgia Yes Statewide Candidate: 
$5,000(primary or 
general election) 
$3,000(primary or 
general run-off) 
Legislative Candidate:  
$2,000(primary or 
general election) 
$1,000(primary or 
general run-off) 
All amounts per election 
cycle. 
$5,000 (State 
Wide) 
$2,000 
(Legislative 
Candidate) 
Statewide 
Candidates: 
$5,000(primar
y or general 
election) 
$3,000(primar
y or general 
run-off) 
Legislative 
Candidates: 
$2,000(primar
y or general 
election) 
$1,000(primar
y or general 
run-off) 
All amounts 
are per 
election cycle. 
Illinois No Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
Kentucky No $1000 Per Candidate Per 
Election 
$1000 Per 
Candidate Per 
Election 
Prohibited 
New Mexico Yes Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
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Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued) 
State Session Limit 
on 
Contributions  
Individual Limit 
 
PAC Limit Corporate 
Contribution 
Limits 
New York No Gubernatorial candidates: 
 
Primary –  
product of number of 
enrolled voters in 
candidate's party in the 
state x $.005, but not less 
than $5,400 or more than 
$16,200 
General - $33,900 
 
Legislative candidates: 
 
Primary  
 
$5,400(senate candidate) 
$3,400(house candidate) 
 
General  
 
$8,500(senate candidate) 
$3,400(house candidate) 
 
All amounts are per 
calendar year. 
 
Maximum contributions 
by an individual cannot 
exceed $150,000 in any 
one year. 
Gubernatorial 
candidates: 
Primary - 
product of 
number of 
enrolled 
voters in 
candidate's 
party in the 
state x $.005, 
but not less 
than $5,400 or 
more than 
$16,200 
General - 
$33,900 
Legislative 
candidates: 
Primary: 
$5,400(senate 
candidate) 
$3,400(house 
candidate) 
General:  
$8,500(state 
senate 
candidate) 
$3,400(state 
house 
candidate) 
All amounts 
are per 
calendar year. 
 
Gubernatorial 
candidates: 
 
Primary - 
product of 
number of 
enrolled 
voters in 
candidate's 
party in the 
state x $.005, 
but not less 
than $5,400 or 
more than 
$16,200 
General - 
$33,900 
 
Legislative 
candidates: 
Primary -  
$5,400(senate 
candidate) 
$3,400(house 
candidate) 
General -  
$8,500(senate 
candidate) 
$3,400(house 
candidate) 
All amounts 
are per 
calendar year.  
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Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued) 
State Session Limit 
on 
Contributions  
Individual Limit 
 
PAC Limit Corporate 
Contribution 
Limits 
New York 
(Continued) 
   Maximum 
Political 
Contributions 
and 
expenditures 
by a 
corporation 
cannot exceed 
$5,000 in any 
one year. 
South 
Carolina 
Yes (Lobbyist 
Only) 
$3,500(statewide 
candidate) 
$1,000(legislative 
candidate) 
Both amounts are per 
election. 
$3,500 (State 
Wide) 
$1,000 
(Legislative 
Candidate) 
Both amounts 
are per 
election cycle 
$3,500 (State 
Wide) 
$1,000 
(Legislative 
Candidate) 
Utah Yes Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited 
Wisconsin Yes (Lobbyist 
Only) 
$10,000(statewide 
candidate) 
$1,000(state senate 
candidate) 
$500(state house 
candidate) 
 
All amounts are per 
election campaign. 
 
An individual may not 
contribute more than 
$10,000 in a calendar 
year to any combination 
of Wisconsin candidates 
or political committees. 
$43,128(gube
rnatorial 
candidate) 
$1,000(state 
senate 
candidate) 
$500(state 
house 
candidate) 
 
 
Prohibited 
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Appendix A: Campaign Finance Laws (Continued) 
State Session Limit 
on 
Contributions  
Individual Limit 
 
PAC Limit Corporate 
Contribution 
Limits 
Wisconsin 
Continued 
  Aggregate 
limit on 
amount 
candidates 
may accept 
from all 
committees, 
excluding 
party 
committees, 
in an election 
campaign: 
$485,190(gub
ernatorial 
candidate) 
$15,525(senat
e candidate) 
$7,763(house 
candidate) 
 
Source: National Conference of State Legislatures: www.ncsl.org 
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